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Abstract:  
Corporate sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans in the US are legally required 
(if underfunded) to make mandatory pension contribution (MPC) as a non-linear function of the 
funding status of the pension plan. Prior literature finds that sponsor firms react to unexpected 
MPC by reducing capital expenditures. This study builds upon this framework to determine if a 
symmetric pattern exists in the response of capital expenditures to whether unexpected MPC is 
unfavorable (additional cash contributions) or favorable (less cash contributions). We find 
additional cash contributions or expense have a significant negative impact on investments of 
cash-constrained sponsor firms (whose capital expenditure exceeds their cash flow frequently). 
However, reduced cash contributions or saving do not exhibit a significant relationship with 
investments, thus, indicating an asymmetric relationship of capital investments with saving and 
expense. 
Previous findings observe an increased prevalence of risk shifting tendencies among 
sponsors with well-funded plans and better credit ratings. Consistent with this style of risk-
shifting, this study finds a higher probability of unexpected MPC (both saving and expense) for 
high-rated sponsors that opt for greater risk (equity) in their pension asset allocation.  Results also 
indicate that plans opting for increased equity allocation face a significantly greater incidence of 
additional contributions - an explanation to why weakly-funded plans or low-rated firms are less 
inclined toward risky allocations in their pension investment strategies.  
Additionally, I document a positive relationship of unexpected MPC (and expense) with 
cash flow volatility of the firm and expect this to translate into a higher cost of debt for the firm. 
However, my findings do not support a positive relationship between unexpected MPC (and 
expense) and borrowing costs. There is evidence that unexpected savings lead to a lower cost of 
debt in case of non-investment grade bonds for the Pension & Investments data sample but this 
result could be sensitive to the sample size and needs further validation. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans are legally required (if underfunded) to 
make mandatory pension contribution (MPC) as a function of the funding status of the pension plan. 
Rauh (2006) and Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012) document the adverse impact of MPC on 
sponsoring firms, such that an increase in MPC (cash outflow) reduces capital expenditures especially 
for financially constrained firms. Furthermore, Factset and Citi report pension contributions in 2012 
comprised 11% of the EBITDA for median industrial firms in the S&P 500 that sponsored a DB plan 
(Kimyagarov & Shivdasani, 2013).  This evidence suggests a significant impact that pension 
contributions can have on corporate activities of the sponsor firm.   
Rauh (2006) distinguishes between expected and unexpected MPC and finds the effect of unexpected 
MPC on capital investment is akin to that of total MPC on investment. The crux of my study lies with 
this distinction between expected and unexpected MPC to be able to address the role of unexpected 
MPC in the corporate framework.  The rationale behind this exercise lies in the identification strategy 
of Rauh (2006) wherein MPC (and unexpected MPC) is proposed as an exogenous financial 
constraint to overcome endogeneity issues arising from the association of earlier proxies with the 
firm’s investment opportunities.  Additionally, my study proposes a further decomposition of 
unexpected MPC to be able to identify a more refined version of the financial constraint.  The 
justification for such a decomposition is that unexpected MPC is not a smooth function, but in reality 
comprises two segments that underfunded sponsor firms could belong to in any pension year – 
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unfavorable unexpected MPC, implying increased cash demands (due to actual MPC being greater 
than expected MPC), and favorable unexpected MPC suggesting implicit cash savings (due to actual 
MPC being less than expected MPC)1.  This study proposes a proxy for unexpected MPC using the 
SEC filings that constitute an easy source of information to investors and other stakeholders 
compared with the Form 5500 filings filed with the Department of Labor2.   
The purpose of MPC is to fund currently accruing benefits as well as reduce the pension funding 
deficit.  Since accruing benefits can be reasonably predicted, it is an expected MPC.  However, 
reducing the pension funding deficit (when pension obligations exceed pension assets) depends in 
part on achieving an expected rate of return on pension assets.  If there is a return shortfall (surplus), 
there will be less (more) pension assets than expected and the pension deficit rises (reduces), causing 
the MPC to increase (decrease).  This shortfall (surplus), and risk of shortfall (surplus), is considered 
to be the unexpected MPC (the difference between actual MPC and the expected MPC)3.  Since these 
shortfalls or surpluses are unexpected, they translate into a source of cash volatility for DB sponsors. 
Therefore, it is pertinent to understand the plan and sponsor characteristics that are associated with a 
greater incidence of this unexpected MPC.  More specifically, the impact of the risk profile of 
pension asset investments (asset allocation) and therefore, of the expected rate of return on these 
assets on the probability of unexpected MPC needs to be identified if firms wish to contain any 
possible volatility in MPC and in its cash flow requirements. 
Campbell et al. (2012) identify cost of capital as the key link between MPC and capital expenditure 
for financially constrained firms - a significantly positive relationship being evidence of market 
friction associated with external financing.  However, they do not distinguish between expected and 
unexpected MPC and, there is no evidence in prior literature to whether incremental cost of capital is 
attributable to expected or unexpected MPC or both. A plausible argument is expected MPC is not a 
                                                     
1 A zero unexpected MPC is possible only if both actual and expected MPC are zero.  
2 Form 5500 filings are available for public use with a significant time-lag of around 10 months owing to 
statutory deadlines. In contrast, Form 10-k data are relatively more timely and user-friendly. 
3 Refer to Section 4 for detailed calculations of MPC, expected MPC and unexpected MPC. 
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cash shock and therefore, is not to be a reason for outside financing and any subsequent change in the 
cost of debt of the sponsor firm. Whether the debt market correctly prices unexpected MPC as a 
source of cash flow volatility or not is open to empirical investigation.  If the volatility of MPC 
manifested through these unexpected MPCs is embedded in the cost of debt, it might be useful to 
address the causes that trigger these unexpected MPCs. A lower volatility in MPC would imply 
enhanced financial flexibility and incremental debt capacity (Kimyagarov & Shivdasani, 2013). 
The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, the study will test whether unexpected MPC (using the 
proxies constructed with the SEC filings) is an investment constraint for the firm and the role a 
financial constraint plays in light of the MPC decomposition. Secondly, the study will determine if 
the pension asset allocation affects the unexpected MPC.  Evidence of both outcomes implies that 
pension asset allocation impacts investment decisions, either as an investment constraint or a 
financing constraint.  
My study uses three different proxies for unexpected MPC – a theoretical proxy following Rauh 
(2006), the second using Pension & Investments survey data on pension asset allocation and the third 
using allocation data available from 10-K filings.  The first part of my analysis, intended to validate 
unexpected MPC and its components as a finer version of a financial constraint, demonstrates cash- 
constrained plan sponsors have to forego investments as a result of unexpected MPC (additional 
contributions/expense). No significant association however, is observed between investments and 
unexpected MPC (reduced contributions/saving) implying an asymmetric effect between capital 
expenditure and both components (saving and expense) of unexpected MPC.  
Results indicate equity allocation significantly increases the probability of additional contributions 
(expense).  Further, plan sponsors that have superior ratings and opt for higher equity allocation are 
found to have a greater incidence of unexpected MPC in terms of both saving and expense. Such 
evidence is consistent with prior findings that well-funded and highly-rated sponsors firms tend to be 
more inclined toward risky pension investment strategies and greater risk in pension investments 
should manifest as greater fluctuations in the MPC of the sponsor firm. 
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Thereafter, I document a significant positive association between cash flow volatility and unexpected 
MPC (expense) for non-investment grade firms. This positive link however, does not translate into a 
positive relationship between unexpected MPC and cost of debt.  Instead, the results imply a negative 
impact of unexpected MPC (and expense) on cost of debt which is contrary to logic. The proxy based 
on the P&I sample does however, indicate that savings significantly reduces the cost of debt for 
below-Baa3 (Moody’s rating) bond issues but the size of this sample of bonds is significantly small 
(63 bonds) to be able to make an assertive conclusion. It is to be noted the relationship of cost of debt 
with unexpected MPC, though in the opposite direction, is stronger than that with expected MPC for 
non-investment grade issues. In addition, I investigate how bond rating behaves in response to 
unexpected MPC or its components and results again suggest a negative relationship between rating 
and unexpected MPC (and expense) for non-investment grade firms. Thus, the relationship of 
unexpected MPC (and expense) with both cost of debt and bond rating appear to be contradictory to 
expectations and prior literature.
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 CHAPTER II 
    DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
 
A. Introduction 
A pension plan is an employee benefit scheme maintained by an employer for accrual of retirement 
benefits to be distributed to plan beneficiaries at retirement or at termination of covered employment 
or beyond.  Pension plans in the U.S. are broadly classified into defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans.  A defined benefit (DB) pension plan bears semblance to the debt instrument - 
plan beneficiaries are promised a steady stream of retirement benefits based on employee age, 
salary/wage and tenure.  The discounted value of the total retirement benefits makes up the pension 
liability while the market value of the assets that pension plan funds are invested in comprises the 
pension plan assets.   
The pension liability can be thought of in different forms, the broadest form being the present value 
of benefits (PVB) that takes into account all accrued benefits as well as all ‘future expected benefit 
payments’ (Novy-Marx, 2013).  This form of economic liability is attributable to both additional 
years of service and potential wage increases.  A narrower version is the projected benefit obligation 
(PBO) which accounts for all accrued benefits as well as future benefits attributable to future salary 
increases, but not to future years of service.  The narrowest version however, is the accumulated 
benefit obligation (ABO).  The sponsor is legally obliged to honor this liability in case of termination 
of the DB plan and therefore, this liability is also referred to as termination liability. This definition 
recognizes benefits accrued for services rendered till date and estimates the same based on current 
and past wage history with no consideration of potential wage increases as in case of PBO.  In
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financial accounting, the firm must fund the projected benefit obligation (PBO) (the funded status on 
the balance sheet of a sponsor firm is the difference between the pension assets and the PBO), but 
funded status under the PBGC and IRS is determined in relation to the current liability (similar to the 
ABO).  
If the market value of the pension assets falls below (rises above) the discounted value of the pension 
obligations, the plan is referred to as underfunded (overfunded).  The plan sponsor, responsible for 
funding adequacy of the plan, makes regular contributions to the plan and bears all investment and 
mortality risk associated with these plans.  Sponsors of overfunded DB plans need not make 
additional pension contributions, but have the incentive to make voluntary contributions to avail of 
favorable tax treatments up to a specified limit.  The Pension Protection Act, 2006, one of the recent 
landmark pension legislations, had in fact enhanced the tax deductibility provisions from 100% to 
150% of the pension obligations.  Underfunded plan sponsors on the other hand, are legally obliged to 
make mandatory pension contributions, to cover newly accrued liabilities as well as a deficit 
reduction contribution.  Apart from employer protection and collateral in terms of pension assets, 
these DB plans are also entitled to another layer of protection from the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), a federal agency established under the aegis of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), 1974, to insure and guarantee pension benefits up to a statutory 
maximum amount.  Underfunded pension plans are subject to higher premiums than fully funded 
plans, which incurs additional costs to the plan sponsor.  
Defined contribution (DC) plans on the other hand, offer retirement benefits that are typically a 
function of the level and timing of plan contributions and investment performance of the assets in the 
individual employee account.  In these plans, contributions are made by the employer and the 
employee or both; however, both investment risk and longevity risk are borne by the 
participant/beneficiary.  The sponsor is not responsible for any guaranteed retirement security to its 
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employees and thus, remains absolved of future fund commitments toward vested or unvested 
pension liabilities as is the case with DB plans. 
B. Regulatory Background 
Prior to 1974, there was little legal protection offered to pension plans. A reform legislation was 
introduced in 1967 through the efforts of late Senator Jacob Javits of New York, following the 
termination of the pension plan at Studebaker in 1963 that had resulted in the loss of retirement 
benefits of more than 4,000 workers.4 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 was the first major governing 
legislation for all private DB pension plans in the US to ensure plan participants receive their 
promised benefits.  ERISA5 requires all underfunded pension plans to make minimum funding 
contributions (MFC), comprised of the current year service cost (the present value of the future 
retirement benefits accruing to the plan participant for services rendered in the current year) and an 
amortized installment of prior unfunded obligations.  It had allowed sponsors up to 30 years to 
amortize their unfunded pension obligations which implied they could conveniently spread the 
pension burden across extended periods of time.  This was presumed to have considerably weakened 
the funding status of many corporate pension plans.  A remarkable feature of this legislation was the 
establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure retirement benefits of 
employees covered by private defined benefit pension plans.  The PBGC receives its finances through 
insurance premiums from DB sponsors, liquidation of pension assets that are taken over along with 
plan liabilities during insolvency of the insured sponsor, income from investments and bankruptcy 
recoveries.  A flat-rate premium determined by the number of plan participants is required of both 
single-employer and multi-employer plans. However, underfunded single-employer plans are further 
                                                     
4 http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are/pg/history-of-pbgc.html 
5 Refer to Munnell and Soto (2003) for a detailed discussion 
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subject to a variable-rate premium defined by the amount of underfunded vested retirement benefits.6  
A criticism of the PBGC is the premiums charged do not fully cover the cost of covering liabilities in 
the case of bankruptcy or default of the plan sponsor.   This mismatch between the price of risk 
protection and the insurance premiums charged apparently incentivize sponsor firms to take more risk 
with their sponsor assets (Lin, Liu, & Yu, 2014).  VanDerhei (1990) provides a methodology to 
estimate more realistic risk-related premiums based on the possible exposure as well as the 
probability of bankruptcy of an underfunded plan sponsor.  The current variable-rate premium 
structure accounts for the plan’s ‘potential severity’ but is lacking in its consideration of the 
probabilities of sponsor bankruptcy. Another criticism is pension beneficiaries may receive less than 
their promised retirement benefits from the PBGC in case of plan termination or sponsor bankruptcy.  
This cap on maximum benefits payable does not work in favor of employees despite the presence of 
PBGC that stands to insure such retirement benefits. 
Another important piece of legislation was the Pension Protection Act of 1987,   introduced with the 
objective of improving the funding scenario.  This legislation initiated deficit reduction contributions 
(DRC), which were essentially ‘catch-up’ contributions targeted toward extremely underfunded 
sponsors, and reduced amortization periods for unfunded pension obligations.  Subsequent significant 
legislations include the Retirement Protection Act (RPA) of 1994 and the Pension Protection Act 
(PPA) of 2006.  The RPA, 1994, instituted additional funding requirements for plans that were 
severely underfunded (refer to Rauh (2006) for a detailed review).  The major provisions of PPA, 
2006, on the other hand, mandated a more direct relationship between the funded status of the pension 
plans and mandatory pension contributions (MPC), an increase in tax-deductibility limits for pension 
contributions from 100% to 150% of the pension liability, and a requirement for plan sponsors to 
fully fund their DB plans within seven years7.  Many firms opted to making more than the minimum 
                                                     
6 http://www.pbgc.gov/about/factsheets/page/premiums.html 
7  The tax deductibility provisions came into effect in 2006 while the accelerated pension contributions to 
achieve full funding within seven years came into effect in 2008. 
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pension contribution around 2006 and 2007 to avail of the tax provisions as well as to avoid being 
labelled as an “underfunded” or “at-risk” firm and consequently, be subject to more restrictive 
provisions (Campbell & Schwartz Jr, 2011). The PPA, 2006, was intended to boost the funded status 
of corporate DB plans as well as the financial health of the PBGC by reducing the risk exposure of 
this federal agency to underfunded plans.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Refer to LaMonte (2006) for a detailed review of the PPA 2006. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Framework of Corporate Pension Policy 
Two major perspectives delineate pension fund studies in academic literature - the traditional versus 
the corporate.  The traditional perspective looks at the pension fund as an entity separate from the 
sponsor and its shareholders.  In this framework, all pension plan decisions, be it funding or asset 
allocation, are a function of pension variables and beneficiary interests, with no consideration of 
corporate variables or sponsor/shareholder interests. Under such an approach, there is however no 
clear answer to what would be the ideal asset allocation for the plan beneficiaries (Bodie, Light, & 
Morck, 1987).  This perspective might have been more relevant when pension assets and liabilities 
were off the firm balance-sheet.  In recent times, however, pension accounting rules have undergone 
major revisions and plan sponsors are required to report the funded status of their plans on their 
balance-sheets.  
The corporate finance approach on the other hand, supports an integrated balance-sheet that extends 
beyond traditional firm assets and liabilities to include pension assets and liabilities. This economic 
approach suggests pension management in alignment with shareholder interests rather than 
beneficiary interests alone.  Bodie et al. (1987) refer to these corporate pension decisions a game 
between the plan sponsor and the different government agencies and interests, the possible elements 
of this game being the tax effect, the pension put effect and the financial slack effect.  
In the pension put framework, given the extra latitude for risk-taking offered by the PBGC, the DB 
pension contract between the plan sponsors and the plan beneficiaries is regarded as a put option 
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written on pension assets and exercisable by the plan sponsor in case of its bankruptcy at a strike 
price equal to the value of the pension obligations (Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 1977).  The protection 
offered by the PBGC has led to moral hazard issues - basically a mini-max strategy whereby 
financially distressed DB sponsors fund pension plans to the minimal possible extent, and take 
maximum possible risk with its pension assets.  Any upside from this risk is gained by firm 
shareholders while any downside from this risk (fall in the value of pension assets and consequent 
bankruptcy of sponsor) becomes the onus of the PBGC in that it provides plan beneficiaries with 
annual pensions up to a statutory amount.  As Petersen (1996) puts it, the shareholders gain at the 
expense of the plan participants (employees) or in case of federal protection from the PBGC, at the 
expense of the federal agency (Marcus, 1987), or essentially the taxpayers of the country.  Legislative 
conditions were however imposed in the late eighties to restrict the unwarranted use of this ‘PBGC 
put’. 
The tax effect on the other hand, refers to a max-min strategy where plan sponsors keep the pension 
plan funded to the maximum limit specified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and invest plan 
assets in heavily taxed instruments, such as bonds, in order to capitalize on the value of the tax-shelter 
to the firm’s shareholders (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981).  In fact, the tax savings from pension 
contributions cannot be ignored with tax shields from pension contributions being almost one-third of 
that from interest payments for DB pension sponsors (Shivdasani & Stefanescu, 2010).  However, the 
best strategy for the sponsor firm to exploit tax-arbitrage opportunities would be to sell off equity 
investments in the pension fund and invest in corporate bonds and on the other hand, issue debt and 
repurchases its own shares - this allows the firm to borrow at the after-tax rate but lend at the pre-tax 
rate since interest paid on bonds issued by the firm is tax-deductible while income from pension fund 
assets is not taxable (Black, 1980).  In addition, increased allocation of pension assets to fixed 
investments would help reduce volatility in the value of pension assets and therefore, in pension 
contributions. 
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Another element in the corporate finance framework is the financial slack effect that regards the 
pension fund as a repository for excess corporate short-term funds.  Such slack could provide a hedge 
against unfavorable times (Bodie et al., 1987) but such a strategy is limited due to legal restrictions on 
the maximum tax-deductible contributions and hefty excise taxes in case of reversion of pension 
assets to the firm (An, Huang, & Zhang, 2013).9  However, the shareholders of the firm can still 
benefit from excess pension assets through decreased pension contributions in the future (Petersen, 
1996). 
The traditional perspective which advocates taking pension decisions with no consideration to firm 
objectives finds little support among industry personnel as well as academic literature.  Friedman 
(1983), one of the earliest studies to explore the interrelationships between corporate financial 
management and pension management, finds evidence that management of pension assets and 
liabilities is not separated from the management of corporate assets and liabilities.  The same study, 
as well as Petersen (1996), observe these pension-firm interrelationships however, do not seem to 
offer support to the conventional hypotheses such as the put effect or the tax effect.  A similar 
observation that the insurance or put effect (minimum funding) and the tax effect (maximum funding) 
need not be the optimal solutions for corporate pension management is proposed in Bicksler and Chen 
(1985) as well.  Rauh (2009) perceives the traditional style as a possibility only in very inefficient 
firms and has, in fact, noted the involvement of the sponsor firm’s board and managers in pension 
investment decisions as well as in the process of selecting investment managers to implement these 
decisions.  
Albeit these different theoretical hypotheses regarding pension asset allocation and funding within the 
corporate finance framework do not seem to be consistent with empirical findings, yet the theoretical 
framework of an integrated economic approach cannot be rejected. Most pension literature adopts this 
                                                     
9  Reversion of pension assets to employer upon plan termination is subject to an excise tax of 20 percent 
provided  the employer establishes/maintains a qualified replacement plan or provides certain benefit increases 
to plan participants of the terminating plan; else, the excise tax rate is 50 percent.  
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structure to empirically test different questions of pension management. Thus, this study also will 
assume the corporate finance perspective as the theoretical construct for testing different hypotheses 
about the pension fund and the corporate sponsor.  
In the context of this corporate finance framework, the lack of perfect substitutability of pension 
assets and liabilities with the traditional ones needs to be acknowledged.  Though  Shivdasani and 
Stefanescu (2010) observe a significant increase in firm leverage when pension assets and liabilities 
are combined with traditional balance sheet components which in turn explains a part of the debt 
conservatism of US firms (Graham, 2000), there are several differences between both categories of 
assets and liabilities. A major difference is the inexpensive nature of pension liabilities relative to 
outside liabilities.  The cost of borrowing from employees by underfunding pension plans is 
substantially less than the cost of outside debt due to various reasons that include information 
asymmetry problems (Akerlof, 1970; Myers & Majluf, 1984), agency and incentive problems (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), or tax issues (Poterba & Summers, 1984).  Further, the guarantee by the PBGC, 
albeit up to a specified amount, of plan benefits to plan participants and the favorable tax provisions 
for pension plans (tax deductibility for pension contributions as well as for income from pension 
assets) allow the plan sponsor substantial leeway in decision-making which is not available with 
ordinary debt liabilities. Of course, such flexibility is contained to some extent since plan sponsors 
cannot easily access pension assets to meet ordinary firm obligations without the accompanying 
excise-tax penalty.  In a more direct contrast, the flexibility in the timing of the pension contributions 
versus debt interest payments, and the explicit placement of traditional assets and liabilities versus 
only the pension funding status (pension assets less pension liabilities) on the firm’s balance sheet 
(Friedman, 1983; Shivdasani & Stefanescu, 2010) bring to light the non-synonymous nature of both 
these liabilities.  
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B. Theoretical background 
Within the framework of an integrated approach, attempts to explore the interrelationships between 
pension finance and corporate finance of a corporate sponsor inevitably begins with the Modigliani-
Miller capital structure irrelevance theorems (Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Modigliani & Miller, 1958), 
the seminal works in investment and capital structure theory.  These theories underlie the irrelevance 
of the firm’s financial policy in firm valuation or wealth of shareholders, absent market frictions.  In 
the pension framework, the equivalent interpretation suggests pension asset allocation has no impact 
on shareholder wealth or employee stake (Petersen, 1996).  However, in the presence of differential 
costs of internal and external financing owing to market frictions, the irrelevance of pension asset 
allocation to shareholder wealth no longer holds.  Increased volatility in pension fund assets through 
greater allocation to common stock or alternative investments would translate into increased volatility 
in the sponsor’s pension contributions and therefore, in the value of the firm (Black, 1980).  Greater 
variability in pension contributions and in the firm’s cash flows would suggest greater risk to the 
bondholders of the firm, too.  One would therefore, expect this risk to manifest in higher costs of debt 
for the sponsor firm.  
A caveat here is cash flow variability would not prove expensive if the sponsor firm’s operating cash 
flows are high when investment opportunities are also high and vice-versa (Petersen, 1996). With no 
financial hedge in place, however, a firm with greater pension allocation to stocks and therefore, 
greater pension contributions during market downswings might seek external financing to avoid 
foregoing positive NPV projects.  In an imperfect capital market, lenders would presume that only 
financially unhealthy firms choose to raise external capital and therefore, would impose a penalty in 
the form of higher costs of debt, especially true for firms with increased capital constraints (Campbell 
et al., 2012). Additionally, as Campbell et al. (2012) elaborates, negative cash shocks from mandatory 
pension contributions could bias a firm toward greater leverage which means an increase in financial 
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risk, costs of equity and in turn, possibly cost of debt too, following Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
Proposition II.  
The above theoretical arguments could be extended to examine the debt market reaction beyond 
mandatory pension contribution to the expected and the unexpected portion of mandatory pension 
contributions.  Assuming a one-year horizon given the firm’s ability to effect pension assets through 
pension contributions made in the prior year and pension obligations by setting appropriate benefit 
levels (Rauh, 2006), the expected MPC could be gauged based on expected return on pension fund 
investments, expected change in interest rates used to compute pension liabilities, normal costs and 
funding credits.  
An ex-ante knowledge of the expected MPC allows the firm sufficient time to plan the expenditure, 
and logically, such expenditure should not prove to be a significant cash flow shock or a financial 
constraint to the firm (Rauh, 2006).  A financial shock, if any, would arise due to unexpected MPCs 
caused by deviations in the actual MPC from the expected MPC. Theoretically, this unexpected MPC 
should therefore, be a better representative of financial constraint (Rauh, 2006).  However, this 
unexpected component could either entail a cash outflow (if actual exceeds the expected, implying 
additional cash contributions) or an implicit cash inflow (if actual is less than the expected, implying 
less cash contributions than expected). Additional cash expenditure attributable to unexpected MPC 
could therefore be deemed a more refined proxy of an exogenous financial constraint. 
It should be noted that the process of estimating expected MPC is not bias-free.  Expected MPC is a 
function of expected pension assets, expected pension liabilities, normal costs and funding credits.  
All except the first determinant can be determined ex-ante fairly accurately and therefore, do not 
entail substantial errors-in-estimation.  Expected assets on the other hand, is subject to potential 
biases embedded in the firm’s expectation of market returns.  In fact, deviations of actual asset returns 
and interest rates from expectations could very well aggravate due to unrealistic return expectations 
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or due to the riskiness of pension assets.  Assuming a firm makes fairly realistic return assumptions, it 
is the risk of the pension portfolio that would then essentially trigger unexpected MPCs.  In other 
words, the magnitude of this unexpected component will vary with fluctuations in the fair value of 
pension assets implying a more volatile pension asset portfolio translates into greater unexpected 
MPCs.  It thus follows that the unexpected MPC should bear a high correlation with the risk profile of 
pension assets or the pension beta (Jin, Merton, & Bodie, 2006). 
Further, the greater the probability of this unexpected component, the greater the cash flow risk 
involved. Such cash flow risk should apparently be factored in and priced by an informationally 
efficient debt market.  A similar reaction might seem unreasonable to assume in the equity market 
since individual equity investors generally lack the investment sophistication visible amongst debt 
market investors who are mostly institutional investors.  Institutional players tend to display greater 
price efficiency (Boehmer & Kelley, 2009; Gujarathi, Gupta, & Raman, 2010; Ronen & Zhou, 2013) 
and therefore, are expected to react to a greater incidence of unexpected MPCs. The findings in 
Campbell et al. (2012) endorse this fact since the magnitude and significance of mandatory pension 
contributions are higher in case of cost of debt vis-à-vis cost of equity as a function of mandatory 
pension contribution of the sponsor firm.  
C. Empirical Background 
i. Mandatory Pension Contributions as Financing Constraints 
The problem of identifying an appropriate measure of financial constraint to study the impact of these 
constraints on firm capital expenditure has spawned many empirical models.  The cash flow variable 
happens to be one of the many proxies suggested, and (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & 
Poterba, 1988) report a positive coefficient for cash flow that increases in magnitude in case of a 
sample of low-dividend paying firms (assumed to be representing financially constrained firms).  
However, many contradictory arguments have been put forth since then, one major concern being the 
inadequacy of Tobin’s Q to capture investment opportunities (Erickson & Whited, 2000; Poterba, 
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1988) - the positive association between cash flow and capital expenditure could actually be 
representing the unaccounted for profitable growth opportunities. Further conflicting evidence comes 
along in the positive association between cash flow and capital expenditure in a sample of financially 
unconstrained firms observed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
A key to this measurement problem in the financial constraint-investment model has been offered by 
Rauh (2006) who introduces mandatory pension contribution as an exogenous financial shock, in the 
presence of other control variables.  Apart from firm and year fixed effects, the author includes non-
pension cash flows and funding status to control for the effect of unaccounted investment 
opportunities.  The most pertinent feature in that model is that the relationship between funding status 
and capital expenditure does not exhibit the non-linearity that exists, by law, in the relationship 
between funding status and mandatory pension contributions.  Therefore, all impact, if any, of 
variations in MPC on capital expenditure, would be deemed exogenous.  
The identification strategy in Rauh (2006) treats mandatory contributions at the point of underfunding 
as threshold events required to identify causality between mandatory contributions (a proxy for 
financial constraint) and investments.  Such a methodology in the generic regression framework 
however, cannot be deemed an exact application of the research discontinuity design (RDD).  As 
Bakke and Whited (2012) put it, RDD has ‘strong local validity but weak external validity’ and 
therefore, offer sound conclusions for only observations that lie in close proximity to the threshold 
event.  
Rauh (2006) finds capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, 
especially for financially constrained firms. Bakke and Whited (2012) attribute the findings in Rauh 
(2006) to a set of severely underfunded plan sponsors with characteristics that are markedly different 
from the rest of the sample firms.  Not surprisingly, Campbell et al. (2012) subsequently note a 
positive relationship between MPC and cost of debt for these cash-crunched firms.  Such firms seek 
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external financing to avoid missing out on capital opportunities but simultaneously face the brunt of 
higher borrowing costs because the market traces the firm’s borrowing stance to financial adversities. 
It is therefore, pertinent to effectively assess and manage DB pension risks in order to contain the 
possibility of frequent unexpected mandatory contributions, and to this end, sponsors can focus on 
three areas: funding strategy, investment strategy and risk management strategy (Bauer, Fletcher, 
Halfon, & Scapino, 2013).   
ii. Funding Strategy 
Designing an appropriate funding strategy for DB plans involves consideration of the plan’s existing 
funded status, pension assets and liabilities, the financial health of the firm and the rules related to 
contributions and tax treatment that govern private DB plans.  
Voluntary pension contributions can improve the funding status of pension sponsors, but Rauh (2006) 
observes sponsors generally tend to make only the required contribution.  Many sponsors also resort 
to in-kind (non-cash) contributions due to several reasons such as preservation of cash and potential 
of the in-kind contribution for capital growth (Mangiero, 2013), reduction in funding deficits along 
with reduced earnings fluctuations and increased  financial flexibility (Cohen & Levine, 2012). Of 
course, an added incentive to keep pension plans sufficiently overfunded is that such sponsors are not 
required to pay variable insurance premiums to the PBGC (Rauh, 2006). 
Underfunding could also be a deliberate outcome while strategizing between pension contributions 
and other corporate activities. Bauer et al. (2013) trace the choice of allocating free funds toward 
corporate investments rather than pension plans to the assumption that such corporate investments 
could bolster the financial strength of the sponsor and enable it to meet future pension obligations 
better.  This allocation of funds towards more optimal corporate activities implies that the pension 
plan will remain either underfunded or unfunded for some time (the authors call it ‘inexpensive 
borrowing’) but the same will enable the sponsor to ‘grow out of the pension problem’. However, this 
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‘inexpensive borrowing’ from employees could have considerable repercussions once pension deficits 
become severe.   
A severe pension underfunding naturally escalates the amount of mandatory pension contributions 
required of the sponsor.  Borrowing to meet these required contributions is regarded by certain market 
factions (eg. Moody’s) as a mutual interchange of debt with no credit impact (LaMonte, 2006).  
Campbell et al. (2012) suggest this assessment is more applicable in case of investment-grade pension 
sponsors since debt markets do incorporate these mandatory contributions while pricing debt issued 
by below investment-grade firms. In extreme circumstances, sponsor firms may also choose to freeze 
their DB pension plans to ease the stress on liquidity (Phan & Hegde, 2013b).   In fact, in a related 
vein, Peterson (1994) observes firms with greater cash flow variability and costs of financial distress 
tend to sponsor a DC plan rather than a DB plan owing to the inherent flexibility of DC plans. 
Different pension assumptions such as the assumed rate of return on pension assets, the discount rate 
for pension liabilities, and the salary inflation rate also offer significant leeway to sponsors while 
deciding on a suitable funding strategy.  Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) note the substantial 
incentives possible through manipulation of pension assumptions when a firm’s earnings are highly 
sensitive to such assumptions and how these opportunistic mechanisms prove convenient during 
deteriorating operating earnings, impending acquisition activities, managerial option exercise 
activities or while determining pension plan asset allocations.  This manipulative context has been 
observed by Amir and Benartzi (1998) who note the expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets 
(an assumption based on ‘prior experience and performance expectations’ and used to smoothen the 
impact of pension expenses on the income statement) fails to explain future returns in the short-term 
as well as the long-term windows. In the context of UK sponsor firms, Li and Klumpes (2012) find 
firms subject to significant revisions in pension accounting regulations opportunistically increased the 
ERR on pension assets when they were closer to default on debt covenants, and used ERR and salary 
growth rate (SGR) jointly to manipulate the leverage appearing on their balance-sheets.  
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The assumed rate of return on pension assets becomes redundant in the computation of the MPC since 
the latter is determined as a non-linear function of the plan funded status.  The impact of assumptions 
on MPC is mostly limited to the discount rate used to determine the ABO of the pension plan. Amir 
and Benartzi (1998) additionally find the percentage of equity investment demonstrates a positive 
relationship with the future returns earned on pension assets.  This result is not surprising and reflects 
the amount of risk in the pension portfolio dictates the return on the portfolio which in turn 
determines the funded status of the plan and MPC.  More risky investments would imply volatile 
asset returns (a volatile funded status) and therefore, volatile MPC. 
Owadally (2003) proposes the ideal situation that does not favor prolonged surpluses and deficits 
irrespective of the conservative or optimistic estimates of pension accounting assumptions and in fact, 
argues plan surpluses hinder the sponsor’s ability to negotiate when plan beneficiaries demand 
additional benefits.   
In sum, the funding gap is impacted through voluntary pension contributions, modifications in 
employment and plan contracts, changes in the value of pension investments through market 
fluctuations and of pension obligations through interest rate movements (Bakke & Whited, 2012).  
The first two alternatives are a function of the sponsor characteristics.  The ability to effect changes in 
actuarial assumptions is limited by legal mandates while the market fluctuations are beyond the 
sponsor’s control. One way therefore, to influence or remedy the funding gap and subsequently, the 
scope for mandatory contributions lay in the choice of pension asset allocation. 
iii. Investment Strategy and Risk Management 
In the practical setting, pension sponsors have little room for flexibility in so far as pension liabilities 
are concerned, given the legal environment, labor market and/or industry practices.  Friedman (1983) 
also observes that if basic pension liabilities are already fixed as part of corporate decision-making, 
then all reference to pension liabilities essentially refers to the underfunded obligations of the plan.  
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Consequently, all decisions pertaining to pension liabilities essentially reduce to decisions about the 
pension assets of the firm.  
However, a coordinated approach to both the plan asset portfolio and the plan liability structure 
would be recommended for firms with underfunded plans.  Sponsor firms could face increased 
pension contributions if the asset portfolio is managed independent of the present value of the pension 
obligations and of the change in these liabilities owing to interest rate fluctuations (Ryan & Fabozzi, 
2002).  Apart from increased contributions, such mismanagement can lead to worsening funding 
ratios and in extreme situations, plan freeze or termination and firm bankruptcy.  
A balanced pension asset allocation of both equity and bonds is one way to mitigate the transfer of 
wealth accruing from corporate level investments to the pension fund, especially for highly levered 
and financially constrained firms (Alderson & Seitz, 2013). However, a high incidence of risky 
investments by pension funds is common despite the contrasting need for controlling cash flow 
volatility - possibly a manifestation of the different characteristics of plan sponsors operating at 
different points of the spectrum.  In fact, the Milliman 2014 Pension Funding Study that focusses on 
the 100 U.S. public companies with the largest defined benefit pension plans assets (amounting to 
more than $1.3 trillion at the end of 2013) reveals that 2013 witnessed significant improvement in the 
funded status of plans with the highest equity allocation (Ehrhardt, Perry, & Wadia, 2014).10 The 
authors attributed it to decreasing plan liabilities due to growing interest rates, and increasing plan 
asset values owing to a remarkable return on plan investments.  
Apparently, an investment bias toward fixed income instruments deprives the sponsor of an 
opportunity to enhance pension fund income through equity investments but such a strategy can 
reduce the amount of wealth transfer from the sponsor to the pension fund.  Such de-risking strategies 
seem especially unattractive to US companies given their ability to impact their earnings with the 
                                                     
10 http://us.milliman.com/Solutions/Products/Corporate-Pension-Funding-Study/ 
22 
 
expected rate of return on plan assets assumed while reporting net periodic pension expense on the 
income statement (Kimyagarov & Shivdasani, 2013).  
As a function of plan-level characteristics, investment decisions primarily depend on the funded 
status and the maturity of pension obligations (Petersen, 1996).  Evidence of a negative relationship 
between risky investments and shorter maturity pension obligations is documented in Petersen (1996) 
as well as Rauh (2009).  There are firm-level characteristics that can influence the investment policy 
of DB sponsors such as financial strength/profitability, risk quotient, tax paying status of the sponsor.   
Rauh (2009) examines risk-shifting versus risk-management strategies of DB plan sponsors in 
pension investments and finds that risk-management strategies are more common among financially 
constrained firms with a greater proximity to bankruptcy while risk-shifting strategies are mostly 
adopted by financially healthy sponsors with superior credit ratings.  Risk-management becomes 
important to firms when challenged with mandatory contributions that can significantly strain their 
cash resources and cause them to lose favorable capital investment opportunities.  Risk shifting, on 
the other hand, finds considerable motivation as outlined in prior studies: the PBGC put effect 
(Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 1977), the scope for earnings manipulation (Bergstresser et al., 2006), 
increased pension benefit demands from employee unions, hedging risks of benefit increases arising 
from wage increases using equity investments (Lucas & Zeldes, 2006) among other reasons.  The 
findings in Rauh (2009) are in line with the evidence in Petersen (1996) who argues that profitable 
firms can afford the volatility associated with risky investments.  Therefore, sponsors that do not find 
a volatile pension portfolio and volatile pension contributions conducive to their operations generally 
opt for a low-risk pension portfolio.  
On the other hand, Addoum, van Binsbergen, and Brandt (2010) exploit the kinks (exogenously 
regulated) in the mandatory contribution function to find that firms, when faced with mandatory 
contributions, tend to reallocate pension investments and take on more risk in a bid to increase the 
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chances of being above the kink points (effect stronger in case of the 20% rather than the 0% 
underfunding kink) - the authors call it ‘gambling for resurrection’.   
An et al. (2013) take an integrated approach and examine several risk-taking hypotheses (risk-
shifting, risk management, tax benefit, financial slack, accounting effect, risk synchronicity and labor 
union hypotheses) to determine risk-taking in corporate pension funds.  Similar to Rauh (2009), they 
find risk management strategies generally rule the scene for sponsors with low funding levels and 
high default risks.  But a non-linear relationship is observed between default risk and pension 
investment strategies with risk-shifting strategies dominating sponsors that are financially distressed 
or have the highest risk of bankruptcy. Another layer to pension risk-taking is that firms with superior 
corporate governance (external and internal) are more inclined to take risk (Phan & Hegde, 2013a).  
If volatile contributions prompt a firm to rethink their investment and risk strategies it is rational to 
expect that such investment decisions could be deemed a precursor to volatility in MPC (or 
unexpected MPC).  
iv. Market Reaction to DB Pension Funds 
Franzoni and Marín (2006) offer empirical evidence of market overvaluation of acutely underfunded 
pension sponsors, and the subsequent low stock returns for up to five years once pension liabilities 
begin to adversely affect the sponsors’ earnings and cash flows (through amortization loss and 
contributions).  They attribute this delayed market response to sponsor decisions on pension 
contributions, and amortization, accounting and fiscal provisions and more importantly, the 
institutional/legal (ERISA) environment that allows plan sponsors considerable time to bridge 
funding deficits.   Further, these negative stock returns following the emergence of a severe pension 
deficit are more pronounced for financially constrained firms since liquidity shocks from mandatory 
pension contributions cause such firms to forego favorable investments, which in turn hurt 
shareholder interests (Franzoni, 2009).  
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Further, Picconi (2006) notes certain pension information, such as changes in pension parameters, 
though available in the 10-k disclosures of pension firms are progressively discounted by investors 
and analysts as their impact starts to manifest in the subsequent quarterly earnings of the firm.  In 
addition, the study finds investors evaluate on-balance-sheet component of the funded status more 
accurately rather than the off-balance-sheet component and the PBO; the latter two elements 
therefore, can significantly predict up to five-year returns. The author suggests the complex nature of 
pension disclosures and the accompanying efforts and costs of interpreting such information as 
possible reasons for the lagged incorporation of otherwise readily available information in prices and 
forecasts. 
The impact of pension underfunding on sponsors is also observed in the debt market.  The decline in 
credit ratings owing to underfunded pension liabilities is greater than the possible upgrade in these 
ratings (engendered by excess pension assets) probably due to the restrictions and costs associated 
with accessing surplus pension assets (Carroll & Niehaus, 1998).  The same study also finds that the 
effect of pension underfunding on credit ratings appears to be greater than that of leverage; the 
authors attribute it to the higher priority of pension debt over long-term debt (leverage) as a likely 
reason.  Cardinale (2007) goes a step further to confirm unfunded pension obligations are reflected in 
credit spreads also, more strongly in case of high-yield bonds than investment-grade bonds.  Similar 
to the asymmetric findings of Carroll and Niehaus (1998), the author finds the bond market reaction 
in terms of a higher credit spread is stronger for pension liabilities than for traditional long-term debt, 
and that pension overfunding does not narrow credit spreads as much as pension deficits tend to 
increase spreads. In a related context, Shaw (2008), while examining the possible impact of the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15811 on cost of debt, concludes that the debt 
market discounts both balance sheet and footnote information in the pricing of new debt issuances 
                                                     
11 SFAS 158, released in 2006, required firms sponsoring defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans 
to report the funded status (the fair value of their pension assets less the projected pension obligations) on their 
balance sheets. This shifted unrecognized pension information (prior gains or losses and prior service costs) 
from the footnote (disclosure required under SFAS 87) to the balance sheet. 
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and a positive association exists between the size of pension liabilities and yield spreads on such 
issues.  
So far as mandatory pension contributions are concerned, they constitute a negative cash shock and 
push a firm toward external borrowings.  As a consequence of market imperfections, these financially 
constrained firms that seek external financing are subject to a penalty in the form of an increased cost 
of capital (Campbell et al., 2012). 
Market participants in fact, incorporate the economic significance of pension risk too.  Jin et al. 
(2006) find empirical evidence that US capital markets incorporate the systematic risk of a firm’s DB 
pension plan (measured via the betas of pension assets and pension liabilities) in the firm’s equity 
betas despite the complicated nature of pension accounting and the off-balance sheet placement of 
certain pension accounting items.  Likewise, a positive relationship has been observed between 
pension beta and debt ratings (McKillop & Pogue, 2009).  
Given the unique characteristics of the corporate pension framework, shareholders of a sponsor firm 
are able to accommodate extra risk, if necessary, to handle an increase in pension obligations.  
However, creditors would then penalize such risky strategies with a greater cost of long-term debt.  
Lin et al. (2014) accordingly empirically documents a positive association between short-term debt 
and the size of pension obligations (ABO) and  argues, on the lines of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Myers (1977), an optimal level of short-term debt as a mechanism to attenuate agency costs of 
debt attributable to pension liabilities.  Further supporting the findings in Campbell et al. (2012), the 
study documents a positive association of cost of debt with pension liabilities/ accumulated benefit 
obligations (ABO) - an indicator of the increased risk and agency problems pension liabilities could 
entail; and of cost of debt with volatility of pension assets – a signal that creditors rationally price the 
risk embedded in pension assets.  Interestingly, the study does not find a significant relationship cost 
of debt with projected benefit obligations (PBO), another measure for pension liabilities, which the 
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authors attribute to the greater uncertainty associated with the estimation of PBO. There is a 
considerable scope for accounting manipulation in the estimation of PBO compared to none in case of 
ABO (Rauh, 2006). 
It is to be noted that the stock market does not appear to immediately process changes in the 
magnitude of pension liabilities (PBO) as well as the long-term impact of such change on cash-flow 
and earnings of the firm (Picconi, 2006).  On the other hand, Lin et al. (2014) find a positive 
relationship between corporate bond yield spreads and the size of the pension liabilities (ABO) (not 
with PBO).  Whether this difference in reactions of the stock market and the debt market to the size of 
pension liabilities is traceable to the difference in the definition of pension liabilities in both the 
studies (ABO vs. PBO) or to the level of information efficiency of each market is not certain.  It could 
be interesting to explore if changes in pension size could still continue to predict future returns in 
Picconi (2006) using the ABO definition.  One would expect a less significant impact given that ABO 
is less vulnerable to choice of assumptions regarding compensation rate and other manipulations.
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CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Mandatory pension contributions (MPC) of DB plans adversely affect sponsors, such that an increase 
in the mandatory contribution (cash outflow) reduces capital expenditures (Rauh, 2006).  The same 
study also documents unexpected MPC to be a more significant and stronger factor than expected 
MPC in explaining the variations in capital expenditure under a pooled specification setting.  
This study attempts to decompose this unexpected MPC (UMPC) into a favorable versus an 
unfavorable cash shock depending on whether the actual MPC is less or greater than the expected 
MPC.  This helps to examine the response of firm investments to a more refined definition of the 
financial constraint.  An unfavorable cash shock (actual greater than expected) suggests additional 
cash outflow which can adversely impact the capital investments of the firm. A favorable (actual less 
than expected) cash shock would imply an implicit cash inflow.  This unexpected inflow could be 
used toward increasing the contribution to the plan in excess of the actual MPC or could be allocated 
to capital expenditures and other corporate activities, with a firm only making the actual MPC. 
Formally, the hypotheses are: 
H1a0: All else constant, both components of UMPC exhibit the same impact on the sponsor’s capital 
investments. 
H1a1: All else constant, each component of UMPC does not exhibit equal impact on the sponsor’s 
capital investments.
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H1a2: All else constant, the unfavorable component (additional cash outflow) of UMPC exhibits a 
negative association with the sponsor’s capital investments. 
H1a3: All else constant, the favorable component (implicit cash savings) of UMPC exhibits a non-
negative association with the sponsor’s capital investments. 
The inverse relationship of MPC with capital expenditure in Rauh (2006) is more dominant in 
financially constrained firms as evidenced by parameters such as credit ratings, dividend ratios, cash 
less debt ratios and if capital expenditures exceed cash flow.  As aforesaid,  Rauh (2006) also 
documents UMPC exercising an impact similar to that of MPC on capital investments, of course, with 
appropriate controls for funding status.  Further, the positive relationship of cost of capital with MPC 
suggested in Campbell et al. (2012) as the underlying mechanism for the findings in Rauh (2006) also 
appears pronounced only for non-investment grade sponsor firms.  
Against this backdrop that reinforces the role of financial constraints, it would be interesting to 
examine if the negative relationship of UMPC with investments persists or disappears when UMPC is 
broken down unto favorable (saving) and unfavorable (expense) shocks in the presence of financial 
constraints. Firstly, it is possible that UMPC, though a cash shock per definition, is not a significant 
influence on the investment expenditure of a financially unconstrained firm. Secondly, for a 
financially constrained firm, one would expect the negative relationship of investments to persist with 
unfavorable UMPC but disappear with favorable UMPC. 
H1b0:  All else constant, UMPC has the same effect on capital investments for both financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. 
H1b1:  All else constant, UMPC does not have the same effect on capital investments for both 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
H1b2:  All else constant, UMPC (unfavorable) has a negative effect on capital investments for 
financially constrained firms only. 
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H1b3:  All else constant, UMPC (favorable) has a non-negative effect on capital investments for 
financially constrained firms only. 
 
Whether it is favorable or unfavorable UMPC in question, UMPC inherently is a direct contributor to 
the cash volatility of the pension sponsor and therefore, on the capital investments of the sponsor 
firm.  Though Rauh (2006) finds the impact of MPC and of UMPC on capital expenditure to be 
similar, a major distinction between both variables is that MPC is a direct function of the plan funded 
status whereas UMPC is a direct consequence of the vulnerability of pension asset investments to 
market risk.  UMPC may or may not engender greater MPC.  It would be erroneous to expect sponsor 
firms facing a greater MPC to also experience a higher incidence of UMPC.  It is therefore, necessary 
to understand the characteristics of firms with a greater exposure to UMPC and consequently, to 
greater cash flow volatility. 
Before identifying the characteristics of sponsor firms with a greater incidence of UMPC, it is 
important to define the reasons that lead to UMPC.  Apparently, a more aggressive asset allocation 
increases the market risk exposure of pension assets which in turn impacts the magnitude of MPC.  
The nature or direction of this impact is uncertain since market shifts could be either favorable or 
unfavorable.  UMPC measures this uncertainty or, the vulnerability of pension assets to market 
volatility - greater the proportion of equity (and alternative) investments, greater the probability of 
unexpected MPC.  Following Amir and Benartzi (1998), this study uses the percentage of equity 
investments in the pension asset portfolio as a proxy for risk.  Accordingly,  
H2a0:  All else constant, there is no association between the probability of unexpected MPC and the 
risk profile of pension assets of the sponsor firm. 
H2a1:  All else constant, there is a positive association between the probability of unexpected MPC 
and the risk profile of pension assets of the sponsor firm.  
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The next pertinent issue is to identify sponsor firms that are more likely to face UMPC.  If UMPC is 
traceable to the amount of risk in the pension asset portfolio, it is logical to conclude that sponsors 
opting for higher risk in their pension investments would face a greater probability of UMPC.  
Generally, the risk quotient in the pension investment policy of a sponsor firm is a function of both 
sponsor characteristics and plan characteristics – sponsors with weak funded status and credit ratings 
adopt the risk management approach whereas their counterparts with strong funded status and credit 
ratings opt for a risk shifting approach (Rauh, 2009).  Apparently, as Petersen (1996) puts it, 
financially healthy sponsors can afford the risk that accompanies equity investments.  A logical 
association is therefore, expected between the probability of UMPC and different sponsor 
characteristics and plan characteristics. Following Rauh (2009), sponsor characteristics shall include 
firm rating, firm size, probability of bankruptcy represented by Altman’s Z-score, volatility of 
operating cash flows and cash flow to assets ratio. Plan characteristics and controls would include the 
size of pension assets relative to firm assets, pension liabilities relative to firm assets, firm employees 
and lagged investment return on the plan assets.  Data for active employee coverage used in Rauh 
(2006) is not available in Compustat and therefore, this study uses the total employees of the firm for 
lack of a better proxy. 
H2b0:  All else constant, there is no association between the probability of UMPC and the plan 
characteristics of the sponsor firm. 
H2b1: All else constant, there is an association between the probability of UMPC and the plan 
characteristics of the sponsor firm. 
H2c0:  All else constant, there is no association between the probability of UMPC and the 
characteristics of the sponsor firm. 
H2c1:  All else constant, there is an association between the probability of UMPC and the 
characteristics of the sponsor firm. 
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The above mentioned hypotheses would be further examined in the light of the two components 
of UMPC to understand whether the influence of sponsor and plan characteristics on the incidence of 
UMPC varies when favorable UMPC versus unfavorable UMPC are considered rather than total 
UMPC. 
 The previous hypotheses explored the reasons for UMPC as well as the sponsor and plan 
characteristics that could be associated with a higher incidence of UMPC.  The next logical extension 
is to identify the influence of UMPC in possible directions.   
Gujarathi et al. (2010) explain a significantly positive association between the assumed rate of return 
(the assumption used to compute pension expense in the income statement and is based on the return 
the corporate sponsor expects from the pension investment portfolio – a risky portfolio would be 
designated a higher rate of return)  and the cost of debt for underfunded firms thus: a higher assumed 
rate needs to be justified using riskier investment portfolios (Bergstresser et al., 2006) which implies 
higher chances of pension deficits and therefore, higher cash flow volatility. This magnifies the 
probability of default on corporate debt which consequently increases the cost of debt.  Interestingly, 
cost of debt is found to be weakly related with the actual rate of return (placed in the footnotes) which 
accurately quantifies the actual performance of the pension investments.  The use of the assumed rate 
of return versus the actual rate is mainly to smoothen the impact of pension earnings on the income 
statement.  Deviations between both the rates are taken into account through ‘unrecognized gain or 
loss’ based on the corridor approach that requires sponsors to amortize this unrecognized amount if it 
exceeds 10 percent of the greater of projected benefit obligation or the fair value of pension assets12.  
In light of Gujarathi et al. (2010), this study thus identifies UMPC as the bridge variable that connects 
cash flow volatility with cost of debt.  Thus, this study seeks to empirically show UMPC connects the 
risk in pension investments to cash flow volatility and therefore, to the cost of debt of the sponsor 
                                                     
12 Actuarial gains and losses arising from either changes in assumptions about the PBO or deviations in the 
actual return from the expected return on pension assets are reported in the statement of comprehensive income 
as other comprehensive income (OCI)(Spiceland, Sepe, & Nelson, 2011)  
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firm.  A positive relationship between UMPC and cash flow volatility would imply the risk in pension 
investments translates into risk in the cash flow of the firm.  Accordingly,  
H3a0:  All else constant, there is no association between UMPC and cash flow volatility of the 
sponsor firm. 
H3a1:  All else constant, there is a positive association between UMPC and cash flow volatility of 
the sponsor firm. 
Additionally, this positive relationship is expected to be more dominant in case of financially 
constrained firms that do not have access to sufficient cash resources that could buffer cash shocks.  
Thus, 
H3a2:  All else constant, the positive association between UMPC and cash flow volatility of the 
sponsor firm is stronger in case of financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms.  
Any impact of UMPC on the cash flow volatility shall heighten the risk of default of the firm and it 
needs to be examined if this implies a higher incremental cost of debt to the plan sponsors.  Campbell 
et al. (2012) confirm Rauh’s findings that MPC is an investment constraint, but then trace the 
intervening mechanism to the firm’s cost of capital by showing a positive relationship between MPC 
and cost of capital of the sponsor firm; the relationship is significant though, only for financially 
constrained firms. Their study treats MPC as a proxy for internal capital constraints, and uses the 
rationale that external funds raised to offset liquidity shocks from MPC would be costlier than 
internal resources owing to market frictions. Apparently, MPC is then expected to bear a positive 
association with cost of capital (and with costs of debt and equity each).  
This study builds on Campbell et al. (2012) and hypothesizes that UMPC has a separate effect than 
the expected component on the incremental cost of debt measured through the yields on the first 
corporate bond issue of the sponsor in that year. The expected component of MPC should not 
constitute a surprise, and sponsor firms should be relatively prepared to fund this portion of the 
mandatory contribution. Specifically, this amount is not a financial constraint and firms should 
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logically not be driven to seek external financing to meet this expected expenditure. No incremental 
change in the cost of capital should therefore, be observed.  
The unexpected component on the other hand, arises due to market movements and is aggravated by 
aggressive pension asset allocation. This unexpected component could imply either additional 
contributions (losses) or gains to the pension fund. While surprise gains fit well with shareholder 
interests, a prolonged incidence of UMPC in terms of additional contributions would not reflect well 
on the financial judgment and risk of the firm. This unexpected component, a reason for potential 
cash flow volatility, can lead to higher costs of debt. This study thus, seeks to show that the positive 
relation between mandatory contribution and cost of debt in Campbell et al. (2012) shall be stronger 
in case of the unexpected component than the expected component of MPC.  
It needs to be noted that if expected MPC appears to have a significant relationship with the firm’s 
cost of debt, it suggests that the debt market assumes that this expected amount could unfavorably 
impact the firm’s risk.  In other words, it reflects the assessment of the firm by the debt market in so 
far as the ability/preparedness of the firm to meet its expected obligations are concerned (Rauh, 
2006). 
H3b0:  All else constant, both expected and unexpected MPC should bear a similar relationship with 
the cost of debt of the sponsor firm. 
H3b1:  All else constant, unexpected MPC (UMPC) should bear a stronger relationship than the 
expected MPC with the cost of debt of the sponsor firm. 
 There might be questions as to how the debt market quantifies UMPC.  This could be through 
various channels including analyst forecasts that discount the impact of UMPC, or debt market 
investors, comprising mostly institutional investors, who are sophisticated enough to assess the risk 
that comes with UMPC.  In fact, several sponsor firms actually report the expected pension 
contributions as part of their SEC filings.  Additionally, if UMPC is positively associated with the 
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cash flow volatility of the firm but not with the cost of debt, this reflects upon the information 
efficiency of the debt market.  It could be attributable to the complicated nature of pension accounting 
and the complex nature of pension information.  In such a situation, the proxy used in this study could 
be a useful tool to measure the impact of risky pension investments on the cash flow of the sponsor 
firm. 
Campbell et al. (2012) show MPC only has an effect on financially constrained firms, but not on 
those that have access to external debt markets. Drawing the inferences further, the effect of UMPC 
on capital investments also are expected to be aggravated in case of firms with greater external 
financing costs (i.e., firms with non-investment grade debt).  As Petersen (1996) rationalizes, 
financially healthy firms can afford the risk of an aggressive pension investment policy.  
Consequently, they are expected to be better prepared to face the cash volatility that accompanies the 
incidence of UMPC and the debt market might not penalize such firms with a higher cost of debt.  
Accordingly, it can be hypothesized that: 
H3c0:  All else constant, the (stronger) relationship of cost of debt with unexpected MPC than with 
expected MPC shall hold for both financially constrained and unconstrained sponsor firms. 
H3c1:  All else constant, the (stronger) relationship of cost of debt with unexpected MPC than with 
expected MPC shall be more pronounced for financially constrained than unconstrained 
sponsor firms. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The main variable of interest in all the above hypotheses is the unexpected MPC (UMPC).  The 
reason for this UMPC is a difference between mandatory contributions for year t as expected in year 
(t-1) and actual mandatory contributions in year t.  A naïve approach would look at the difference 
between expected total contribution in year (t-1) and actual total contribution in year t instead of 
looking at the difference between actual and expected mandatory contributions.  So, before delving 
further into expected and unexpected mandatory contributions, the implications of examining 
mandatory pension contributions versus total pension contributions need to be discussed.  It would be 
worthwhile here to reiterate the arguments proposed in Rauh (2006) and Campbell et al. (2012) that 
mandatory contributions are an exogenous shock to the internal financial resources of a firm.  This 
contribution is independent of the firm’s growth opportunities and overall operating framework in the 
presence of appropriate control variables.  The impact of this contribution (exogenous shock) are in 
addition to the control variables in Rauh (2006) which include Tobin’s Q and internal cash flows of 
the firm as proxies for the profitability of investment opportunities of the firm; and firm and year 
fixed effects and most importantly, the funding status of the firm to account for variations in 
mandatory contributions that might correlate with the firm’s investment opportunities.  The presence 
of funding status is the key aspect that serves to purge the estimated mandatory contributions of 
endogeneity issues. 
In contrast, the voluntary component of total contributions (that includes both mandatory and 
voluntary contributions) is correlated with several other variables including funding status, cash 
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flows, investment opportunities, financial health of the firm and so forth.  Consequently, total 
contributions, an aggregate of mandatory, voluntary and noncash contributions, cannot be treated as 
an exogenous financial constraint.  MPC therefore, is the right proxy to be used in the current 
empirical setting and therefore, this study considers the difference between total MPC and expected 
MPC (UMPC) rather than the difference between total contribution and expected contribution in any 
pension year. 
IRS Form 5500 filings, available from the Department of Labor, contain information on plan level 
information of DB sponsors in the US.  Rauh (2006) uses this source for the period from 1990 to 
1998 for data regarding funding status and normal cost required to compute MPC.  MPC is computed 
as the maximum of the minimum funding contribution (MFC) and the deficit reduction contribution 
(DRC).  The MFC is the amount of contribution required of underfunded plan sponsors under ERISA 
and is computed as (normal cost + 10% of ERISA underfunding) where underfunding, in the context 
of ERISA, is defined as that portion of projected benefit obligations that neither are backed by 
pension plan assets nor will be covered by projected normal costs contributions.  The DRC on the 
other hand, is the contribution aimed at severely underfunded DB plans.  DRC, expressed as a 
percentage of firm funding, is defined as min [0.30, [0.30 - 0.25*(funding status – 0.35)]] for the 
period 1987-1994 and as min [0.30, [0.30 - 0.40*(funding status – 0.60)]] for 1995 and later.  
Initially, plan sponsors were required to reduce the underfunding over a 30-year period, but the 
Pension Protection Act (2006) now requires the funding deficit to be eliminated over a 7-year period.   
A later study by Campbell et al. (2012), following Moody’s estimate outlined in LaMonte (2006), 
proposes a new proxy for MPC using 10-k filings that are definitely more timely and user-friendly 
compared to the Form 5500 filings.  This proxy is estimated thus: if the fair value of pension assets 
(FVPA) is less than the projected benefit obligation (PBO), then MPC is equal to [normal cost plus 
(ABO – FVPA)/30 scaled by total firm assets]; else if FVPA is equal or greater than PBO, then MPC 
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equals zero. ABO here refers to accumulated benefit obligations based on current salaries versus PBO 
that is based on future salaries.  
Campbell et al. (2012) validates Moody’s proxy by replicating the findings in Table II (1c and 2c) in 
Rauh (2006).  In order for the sample to be consistent with firms that file Form 5500, Campbell et al. 
(2012) include only domestic firms that report a positive pension expense; the remaining mismatch in 
sample size being attributed to not being able to identify sponsor firms that have less than 200 
employees and are not needed to file Form 5500  This study uses the following definition to arrive at 
MPC in year t: 
MPC t = Service cost t + (ABO (t-1) - FVPA (t-1)) / (30(if pre-2008) or 7(if 2008 and after))13 
The rationale for the slight modification in the formula is because MPC is a function of the current 
service cost and an amortized portion of the underfunding at the beginning of the plan year.  The 
funding gap at the start of the plan year needs to be determined by the difference between lagged 
pension assets and liabilities rather than contemporaneous pension assets and liabilities. This slight 
modification is in line with Rauh (2006) where total pension assets are defined as the current value of 
pension assets at the beginning of the plan year in Form 5500 filings while total pension liabilities are 
the current liabilities (ABO) available from Schedule B of the Form 5500 filings. 
It is expected that sponsor firms will have a fair estimate (at the beginning of year t-1) of the MPC 
required of them at the beginning of year t.  Rauh (2006) develops a measure for expected mandatory 
contributions attributable to the firm’s potential to exert a one-year influence on pension assets 
through contributions in the prior year and on pension liabilities through benefit accruals for the same 
period.  Rauh (2006) expresses mandatory contribution thus:  
Mandatory Contributioni,t,k = M(yi,t,k) 
                                                     
13 The amortization period was changed from thirty years to seven years under the Pension Protection Act of 
2006. 
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where yi,t,k is a vector comprising pension assets(PAi,t,k), pension liabilities(PLi,t,k), normal 
cost(NCi,t,k), and funding credits(FCi,t,k) for plan k of firm i at time t. 
Thereafter, following Rauh (2006), expected MPC is deducted from the actual MPC to arrive at 
unexpected mandatory contributions. 
Unexpected MPCi,t,k = Actual MPCi,t,k− Expected MPCi,t,k 
= M(yi,t,k) − M(Et−1[yi,t,k]) 
= M (PAi,t,k,PLi,t,k,NCi,t,k,FCi,t,k) − M(Et−1[PAi,t,k], Et−1[PLi,t,k], NCi,t,k, FCi,t,k)   (1) 
In (1) above, normal cost (NC) and funding credit (FC) are generally known beforehand. The 
expected pension liabilities are computed as actual liabilities, with a correction for the change in the 
30-year Treasury rate.  The expected pension assets are determined by applying the expected rate of 
return Ri,t,k
e to lagged pension assets i.e,  
Et−1[PAi,t,k] = (1 + Ri,t,k
e )PAi,t−1,k       (2) 
To determine Ri,t,k
e , Rauh (2006) assumes that the firm invests in only large-cap corporate equity and 
intermediate-term government bonds such that for each plan, 
Ri,t,k
e =  ŝi,t,k[R̅
S] + (1 −  ŝi,t,k)[R̅
B]       (3) 
where  ŝi,t,k is the implied share of the pension assets invested in stock while  R̅
S is the large-cap 
corporate equity return averaged over 1926-1990 and R̅Bis the intermediate-term government bond 
return averaged over the same period. Both averages are available from Ibbotson Associates (2003) 
time series database.  
39 
 
Rauh (2006) then uses each plan’s actual returns14 [Ri,t,k = Investment Incomei,t,k/PAi,t−1,k] and the 
time series returns of the two investment possibilities from Ibbotson Associates (Rt
S for stock returns 
and Rt
Bfor bond returns) to approximate ŝi,t,k. 
Ri,t,k =  ŝi,t,k Rt
S + (1 − ŝi,t,k )Rt
B       (4) 
The ŝi,t,k computed from (4) is plugged back into equation (3) to arrive at Ri,t,k
e  which in turn is used 
to compute Et−1[PAi,t,k] in equation (2). 
The approach in this study shall follow Campbell et al. (2012) to arrive at MPC (and expected MPC); 
it then modifies Campbell et al. (2012) methods to decompose the MPC into expected and unexpected 
components using the methodology in Rauh (2006) described above. It is to be noted, in the context 
of pension variables, that this study uses firm-level data (directly available from Compustat) while 
Rauh (2006) uses plan-level data (from Form 5500 filings) aggregated to the firm-level. Further, to 
overcome the limitation of assuming a two-investment portfolio in (3), this study suggests an 
alternative methodology to estimate the expected fair value of pension assets - the use of actual asset 
allocation data at the beginning of each period available from Pensions & Investments (P&I) survey 
and from Compustat (10-K filings) in conjunction with standard indices to compute the returns on 
different asset classes15 and directly arrive at the expected rate of return for that period.  The expected 
fair value of pension assets at the end of year (t-1) would be a product of this expected rate of return 
and the fair value of pension assets as at the beginning of period (t-1) or end of period (t-2). 
Expected FVPA (t-1) = Expected Rate of Return (t-1) * FVPA (t-2) 
                                                     
14 The actual dollar returns for pension plans is reported by Compusat as Pension Plans Expected Return on 
Plan Assets (PPRPA) till 1997 and as Pension Actual Return on Plan Assets (PBARAT) from 1998 onward. 
The variable PPRPA is coded as negative in case of positive returns and as positive in case of negative returns. 
This needs to be taken into consideration in future studies. 
15 The Others asset category in both the Compustat and P&I sample are assumed to be invested in equity to 
arrive at the rate of return expected on pension assets for each pension sponsor. It should be noted that both the 
number of sponsors who report investment in this category and the magnitude of allocation in this category are 
not substantial relative to other categories. 
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Once the expected fair value of assets is computed, Moody’s proxy will be modified to arrive at 
expected MPC: 
Expected MPC t = Service cost t + (Expected ABO (t-1) - Expected FVPA (t-1))/ 30(if pre-2008) or 7(if 
2008 and after) 
The following timeline illustrates the points at which MPC, expected MPC and UMPC are 
determined: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study accesses multiple sources of data for the sample period from 1990 to 2010. Firm-level 
information for all firms with DB assets are obtained from the Compustat Fundamentals (annual) file 
while firm-level data on pension contributions (MPC) as well as funded status of DB plans are 
obtained from Compustat Pensions (annual)16.  Data on new bond issues are gathered from the SDC 
Global New Issues Database. This study uses asset allocation data available in Compustat (from 
2003) and from the Pension & Investments (P&I) survey data as well for validating the conclusions 
arrived at using the theoretical construct described above.  The allocation data in P&I survey pertains 
to DB sponsors with the largest amount of pension assets in the economy and offers a finer 
classification (ten asset categories: Equity - Domestic and International, Debt- Domestic and 
                                                     
16 It is not possible to distinguish between domestic and foreign pension liabilities using Compustat data and 
hence, the pension assets and liabilities data used in this study are inclusive of both. Of course, appropriate 
filters are used to retain only firms registered in the US in the sample. 
Plan year t Plan year (t-1) Plan year (t-2) 
Computation of expected 
MPC [Et-1(MPC t)] 
[Zero or positive] 
A. Computation of actual MPC [MPCt]                    
[zero or positive] 
B. Computation of unexpected MPC [UMPC t] 
[Zero or positive or negative] 
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International, Cash, Private Equity, Real Estate, Mortgage, Alternative Assets and Others) compared 
to that in Compustat (limited to four categories viz. Equity, Debt, Real Estate and Others). The firms 
on P&I survey data have been hand-matched with Compustat Annuals by company name and efforts 
have been made to trace all possible changes in names due to mergers and acquisitions to ensure the 
best match. The return indices used for each of the asset categories while computing unexpected MPC 
are specified in the appendix (Appendix II). The number of DB sponsors covered in P&I allocation 
data prior to 1997 is limited. Though this study attempts to use the P&I data from 1997 onward, the 
unexpected MPC variable yields a substantially low number of observations till 2000. Hence, most 
analyses in this study that employs P&I data would be confined to 2000 and onward.  
The baseline specification for the investment-financial constraint modelling (hypotheses 1a and 1b) is 
borrowed from Rauh (2006) and modified to validate the proxies for MPC and UMPC used in this 
study. Model (A) incorporates the impact of the favorable and unfavorable components of UMPC on 
capital expenditures.  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 / 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                           ------------------------- (A) 
 
 The baseline model is going to be augmented with squared and cubed powers of funded status 
as stringent controls for firm heterogeneity, financing cash flows and leverage to consider possible 
sources of funds that cannot be accounted for by nonpension cash flow, and a dummy for 2008 when 
the economic recession took place and important funding provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 
2006 went into effect.  
 Theoretically, expected MPC should not bear a significant relationship with capital 
expenditure of the firm since it is an anticipated cash flow and sponsor firms would generally plan for 
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such expenditures.  Rauh (2006) attributes the significance of this predicted MPC in his fixed effects 
specifications to the inappropriateness of the specification relative to the pooled specification.  The 
latter contains the first three powers of the firm’s funding status that not only account for the funding 
status per se but also serve to account for the heterogeneity across sponsor firms.  Apparently, 
expected MPC is not significant in the latter framework.  As an alternative rationale, Rauh (2006) 
adds that a significant relationship between expected MPC and investments could be a reflection of 
the sponsor’s short-term investment planning horizon or a context where such contributions could not 
be predicted sufficiently ahead of time for financing to adjust accordingly.  The latter situation would 
be aggravated in the presence of long-term constraints that cause capital investments to be 
increasingly reliant on internal funds of the firm. Given that the pooled specification is a stringent 
specification with aggressive controls, most of the models used to examine the relationship of 
unexpected MPC and capital investments would contain year fixed effects only. 
 Tobin’s Q, a proxy for unobserved investment opportunities, as well as non-pension cash 
flow are expected to be positively associated with the capital investments of the firm.  Non-pension 
cash flow constructed as net income plus depreciation and amortization plus pension expenses, takes 
care of the possible conceptual inadequacy of Tobin’s Q and thus, controls for investment profit 
opportunities (Rauh, 2006). In other words, it absorbs shocks from asset performance in prior periods 
that could otherwise effect a relationship between investments and MPC in subsequent periods, 
especially for financially constrained firms.  Further, any time-invariant factors that could impact the 
relationship between investments and MPC of the firm are accounted for by year fixed effects.  The 
most important feature of this empirical specification however, is the presence of the funded status of 
the firm’s pension plans. The expected positive relationship of funded status with capital expenditure 
is a function of the internal funds and the investment opportunities of the firm.  Any impact of MPC 
on capital expenditure would therefore, be deemed an internal cash shock cleansed off any 
endogeneity problems. 
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Rauh (2006) also finds UMPC has a negative and significant coefficient with a magnitude similar to 
that of total MPC, endorsing that UMPC proxies MPC close enough to measure investment 
sensitivity to internal cash constraints of the firm.  In the current framework, the decomposition of 
UMPC into favorable and unfavorable MPC yields a more refined version of this internal cash 
constraint, and consequently, the negative association should persist in the case of unfavorable UMPC 
only.  The association in case of favorable UMPC (implicit cash inflow) should be non-negative since 
the sponsor firm could decide to continue with its expected pension payments or direct the cash 
savings to productive investments – in either case, no diversion of funds from capital investments to 
MPC takes place.  
 Following Rauh (2006) and Campbell et al. (2012), these specifications are further extended 
to include credit ratings and a cash constraint measure (based on how frequently capital investments 
exceed the cash flow of the firm) as an indicator of financial strength of the sponsor firm. This would 
help examine the relationship of each of the two components of UMPC with investments in the 
presence of financial constraints. The negative (non-negative) association between unfavorable 
(favorable) UMPC and cash investments should hold only for cash constrained firms; such 
relationships should not prove significant for unconstrained firms. 
The next set of specifications attempt to trace the cause of UMPC and also identify the firm and plan 
characteristics associated with the incidence of UMPC (hypotheses 2a through 2c).  The proportion of 
equity in the pension portfolio, a proxy for the riskiness of the pension portfolio, determines the 
incidence of UMPC and a positive relationship is therefore, expected between both variables.  
Further, Rauh (2009) examines pension fund asset allocation as a function of plan and sponsor 
characteristics.  Since UMPC is a function of the risk quotient of the plan asset allocation, the 
empirical model in Rauh (2009) is modified to examine the plan characteristics associated with a 
greater probability of UMPC.  
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In probit specification (B) (that tests hypotheses 2a and 2b), pension assets (liabilities) are expected to 
be positively (negatively) related to the dependent variable following prior findings that firms with 
well-funded plans are more inclined to invest in equities while those with weakly funded plans tend 
toward risk-management strategies  (Petersen, 1996; Rauh, 2009).  The same studies also find that a 
greater proportion of active employees, indicative of a longer maturity of pension obligations, is a 
significant driver for greater risk-taking in pension investments. Since the data on active share of 
employees for each plan in not available in Compustat, the next best alternative is to consider total 
employees as a proxy for the former.  Following Rauh (2009), all variables are lagged since UMPC, 
by construction,  is a function of their lagged rather than contemporaneous impact. Year fixed effects 
are further incorporated in the model for all year specific characteristics that could impact the 
incidence of UMPC.  A dummy for 2008 is introduced to account for the financial crisis of 2008 and 
the funding provisions of the Pension Protection Act, 2006, that went into effect from 2008 onward.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              ------------------------- (B) 
 
Again, in line with Rauh (2009), probit specification (C) examines the characteristics of sponsor firms 
that could be associated with greater risk-taking in pension assets and therefore, with the recurrence 
of unexpected MPC (hypothesis 2c).  For reasons discussed above, a financially healthy sponsor 
would be expected to take on more risk – a positive relationship is therefore, expected between  cash 
flow to assets/ Z-score/ operating assets and the probability of UMPC.  The numerical equivalent of 
S&P rating is such that AAA equals 1 (=22/22) and D equals 1/22; thus, this rating variable should 
bear a positive association with the probability of UMPC.  With regard to the volatility of operating 
cash flow, it is possible that firms could choose to contain operating risk through safer pension 
investments and thereby, face a lower probability of UMPC. A negative relationship could thus, be 
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predicted between this cash flow risk and the incidence of UMPC.  On the other hand, this variable 
could be representative of risky firms that are willing to take on risk in their pension allocation and 
could end up with a higher probability of UMPC. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑆&𝑃 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑍‒ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       ------------------------- (C) 
 
To examine the influence of sponsor and plan characteristics on the incidence of favorable versus 
unfavorable UMPC, the dependent variable in (B) and (C) will be modified accordingly. 
 Hypothesis (3a) that examines the relationship of UMPC with  cash flow volatility is tested with 
specification (D) which is similar to the one employed in Gujarathi et al. (2010).  The premise in 
Gujarathi et al. (2010) is that higher cash flow volatility will be followed by a higher stock return 
volatility and therefore, their study uses standard deviation of returns as a proxy for cash flow 
volatility in their specification.  This study assesses the impact of UMPC directly on a five-year cash 
flow volatility to judge if UMPC poses a risk to the cash flows of the firm and therefore, to the debt 
holders of the firm.  Sponsor firms with high levels of UMPC as well as higher levels of financial 
leverage/ earnings volatility/no rating experience a greater volatility in its cash flows.  On the other 
hand, larger and more profitable firms are generally characterized by stable cash flows; hence a 
negative association would be expected between cash flow risk and total assets/ return on assets.  
S&P credit rating (numerical equivalent implies a high score for high rated firms and vice-versa) 
should bear a negative relationship with cash flow volatility since high-rated firms are exposed to less 
cash flow risk. A high book-to-market ratio could be representative of either a distressed or a value 
firm while a low ratio could imply a growth firm.  It is difficult to predict the association between this 
ratio and the cash flow risk of the firm. 
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =   𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆&𝑃 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            ------------------------- (D) 
 
Finally, the association of unexpected MPC and cost of debt (hypothesis 3b and 3c) will be tested 
using the empirical design (specification (E)) proposed in Campbell et al. (2012).  The positive 
association between MPC and cost of debt in Campbell et al. (2012) is evidence that MPC is a 
financial constraint that forces sponsor firms to seek outside financing that, in conjunction with 
market frictions, in turn cause an increase in the cost of borrowing of the firm.  The decomposition of 
MPC allows the distinction of this financial constraint into an expected and unexpected component. 
The expected component could be a financial constraint for cash-crunched firms but the unexpected 
component by definition should prove to be the more persistent internal resource constraint.  So, this 
study proposes that the positive relationship between UMPC and cost of debt is stronger than that 
between expected MPC and cost of debt.   
Funded status is included in the model since it is closely related to the financial strength of the firm. 
Underfunded firms generally represent firms that are cash-constrained and therefore, unable to fully 
fund their pension plans. Owing to the risk attached with such firms, debt markets impose a penalty 
on such firms in terms of a higher cost of debt, thus implying a negative relationship between the 
funded firms and the cost of debt. Amongst firm-level characteristics, larger and more profitable 
firms would be considered less risky and therefore, subject to lower costs of borrowing. Accordingly, 
a negative relationship is predicted between cost of debt and market value of equity/ return on assets. 
Higher leverage/ stock return volatility would increase the risk of the sponsor firm and therefore, the 
cost of debt.  As aforementioned, the relationship between book-to-market and the risk of the firm is 
difficult to predict.   
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The issue-level characteristics definitely affect the cost of debt.  The yield spread should exhibit a 
positive association with the proceeds and maturity of the issue since larger issues imply greater 
default risk while longer-maturity means greater liquidity premium.  Credit-rating, where one stands 
for an Aaa Moody-rated bond while twenty represents a Ca bond, is predicted to bear a positive 
association with borrowing costs.  Further, owing to the priority accorded to senior-debt issues, the 
yield spread is expected to be lower for such issues.  Following Campbell et al. (2012), the public 
debt indicator is incorporated in the model specification to distinguish between a typical public issue 
and a Rule 144a debt issue (equals zero if Rule 144a issue and one otherwise).  This distinction is 
necessary since the market for Rule 144a debt issues is restricted to certain institutional investors and 
such issues are also subject to fewer regulations than a typical public issue.  Lower liquidity, greater 
information asymmetry and less investor protection engender a higher yield spread for such issues.  A 
negative relationship is subsequently predicted between cost of borrowing and the public debt 
indicator. Year-specific effects (that impact all firms in any particular year) and industry-specific 
effects (that affect variations in cost of debt of the firm typically over time) are included in the 
specification.   
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
Log (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
Log (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿og (#𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        ------------------------- (E) 
 
The above empirical model would be re-estimated with a sample partition based on whether the firm 
issues investment-grade bonds or not (Campbell et al., 2012) to investigate the impact of financial 
constraints on the association between UMPC and cost of debt (hypothesis 3c). 
48 
 
CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS 
 
Summary statistics for variables (relevant for hypotheses 1 and 2) are presented in Table 1. Unless 
specified otherwise, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distribution 
and scaled by lagged firm assets. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 The average capital expenditure is 5.7 percent of firm assets, with a range of 0.1% to 28.8% 
of firm assets for the sample firms. Non-pension cash flow, constructed as net income plus 
depreciation and amortization plus pension expense following Rauh (2006), has a mean and median 
of 9.5% and 9.2% of firm assets. Pension expense and depreciation and amortization are non-cash 
items on the income statement and therefore, added back to net income. Financing cash flow is 
representative of all cash flows related to financing activities and is available from Compustat.  It is 
negative up to the 50th percentile and only positive for firms in the 75th percentile and upward. These 
negative financing cash flows cannot be deemed an indicator of a financially weak firm (unlike in the 
case of non-pension cash flows) since such negative cash flows could be attributable to sale or 
retirement of debt, payment of dividends, change in current debt etc.  
Funded status, the difference between pension assets and accumulated pension obligations (does not 
assume potential salary increases), is averaged at 3.1% of firm assets with 50th and 75th percentile 
values at 0.7% and 4.2%. This suggests the sample is positively skewed toward well-funded firms. A 
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caveat to this is the definition of the funded status variable. If funded status is defined instead as the 
difference between pension assets and projected benefit obligations (assumes potential salary 
increases) as per ERISA requirements, the funded status of plan sponsors would worsen, thus, leading 
to greater MPC and consequently, a greater impact on capital expenditure and other financing 
variables. However, this study uses the ABO-based definition following Bodie (1990) and Rauh 
(2006). Bodie (1990) argues sponsor firms do not regard PBO as the target measure of benefits in 
their pension investment policies as evident from their tendency to invest more in equities rather than 
inflation-protected investment avenues. Equities are not exactly the apparent choice of investment for 
investors wanting to hedge against inflation risk. 
The distribution of mandatory pension contribution (MPC) with a mean of 0.2 % of assets and a 
standard deviation of 0.4% is not very different from that in Rauh (2006) with a mean of 0.1% and a 
standard deviation of 0.3% of firm assets. It is to be noted that unexpected MPC using the 
methodology in Rauh (2006) (referred to as theoretical methodology from hereon), the actual data 
allocation in Pension & Investments (P&I) survey data and in 10-K Filings (available from 
Compustat) are distributed very similarly, despite the difference in time periods: 1991-2010 for the 
theoretical methodology, 2000-2010 for P&I allocation data and 2003-2010 for Compustat allocation 
data. Figure 1 presents the trend in the three types of unexpected MPC for the period 2003 to 2010 
which is common to each of the three proxies. Unexpected MPC (theoretical) bears a high correlation 
(pairwise) of 96.36% and 95.89% with unexpected MPC constructed with P&I and Compustat data 
respectively. The correlation between unexpected MPC as per P&I data and as per the Compustat 
data is high at 99.46% as expected.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Similarly, the percentage invested in equity which are actual percentage allocations in case of the P&I 
and Compustat data but is a computed number in case of the theoretical methodology, follow a 
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similar distribution in all three cases. The variation is however, higher with the theoretical 
methodology. This could be due to the fact that certain equity allocation percentages in this set-up are 
less than negative one and greater than positive one in cases where the pension investment return of 
the bond and equity portfolio in any year falls outside the range of return on the bond and equity 
indices. This study does not exclude these allocation figures (outliers) in order to retain the variation 
in equity allocation dictated by the methodology. It does however, exclude lagged expected return on 
pension assets (106 firm-year observations from a sample of greater than 20,000 firm-year 
observations) that lie outside the range of positive and negative one.  
The equity allocation data from P&I survey bears a correlation of 50.14% with that from Compustat 
which alleviates the concern to some extent that the asset allocation data from P&I survey pertains to 
September 30 of each year while the allocation data on Compustat pertains to fiscal year-end. The 
equity allocation figures according to the theoretical construct has a correlation of around 14.79 % 
and 9.26% respectively with that from Compustat allocation data and P&I allocation data. 
The average age of firms in the sample is 29 years and most firms are rated BBB or BBB-on average. 
This suggests that the sample is slightly skewed towards higher-rated firms (each rating is scaled by 
22 such that the numerical equivalent of AAA is one and of D is 1/22 or 0.045 at the limits while of 
BB at the middle of the spectrum is 0.5).  
Table 2 contains results from columns 3 and 6 of Table V in Rauh (2006) and the corresponding 
results for the theoretical construct of unexpected MPC.  The results in this table are intended to 
validate my theoretical proxy for unexpected MPC. It is to be noted that Rauh (2006), as a 
justification for the significance of predictable MPC in his study, comments that the fixed effects 
specification may not be a correct specification for a framework with expected and unexpected 
elements since these variables are ‘averaged within firms’ through time. Consequently, the impact of 
the expected and the unexpected components could get washed off. The pooled specification 
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containing the first three powers of the funded status is a more ‘aggressive control’ for funded status 
and therefore, for firm heterogeneity. Further, since MPC (and unexpected MPC) is proposed as an 
exogenous financial constraint in light of the distinctive non-linearity in the relationship between 
MPC (and unexpected MPC) and funded status (a feature absent in the relationship between funded 
status and capital investment), it would be more appropriate to require powers of the funded status in 
the model specifications. The fact that the theoretical proxy does not replicate the original fixed effect 
specification therefore, is not of major concern in this study. In the pooled setting,  the coefficient for 
unexpected MPC is significantly negative as in Rauh (2006).  
My study also augments the baseline model by introducing financing cash flows and leverage to 
further control for possible sources funds. There are several items in the sources and uses of funds 
framework that are not accounted for in non-pension cash flow since the latter mostly focusses on 
operating cash flows and not financing cash flows. In the augmented model, the coefficient for 
unexpected MPC is significant at 5% and expected or predictable MPC is not significant as observed 
in Rauh (2006). Given the pooled specification yields results as hypothesized and is more justified in 
the predictable and unexpected framework, all further analyses to examine the impact of unexpected 
MPC (and savings versus expenditure) on investments would be undertaken in the pooled 
specification setting. In Table 2 (pooled specification), funded status is negative but not significant; 
however at higher values of funded status (squared funded status), the negative impact on capital 
investments is magnified. The cubed funded status variable is positive and insignificant. Drawing on 
Rauh (2009) where funded status is deemed an indicator for the financial health of the sponsor, it 
would be fair to conclude that at lower values of funded status, there is a negative relationship 
between funded status and capital investments but at higher values, the rate of decrease in 
investments decreases significantly. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
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Having validated the theoretical proxy for unexpected MPC, Table 3 (Panel A) now examines the 
impact of unexpected MPC on capital investments from 1991 to 2010. The coefficient for unexpected 
MPC is negative and significant at 5% for the entire period (Table 3, column 3) versus at 1% in the 
1990-98 period for the baseline model (Table 2, column 4). In the augmented model, the explanatory 
power of unexpected MPC as an exogenous financial constraint is no longer significant (Table 3, 
column 6) relative to being significant at 5% in the 1991-98 period (Table 2, column 5).  
In an effort to identify if there is a structural break in the explanatory power of unexpected MPC after 
the financial crisis, the baseline and the augmented models are re-examined for the 1991-2007 period. 
Results in Panel B of Table 3 indicate unexpected MPC continues to remain significant at 1% with a 
negative coefficient of 0.649 and at 5% with a coefficient of -0.469 for the baseline and augmented 
models respectively. Expected MPC is negative and significant at 10% in the basic model but 
insignificant in the augmented model for the same period.   
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
The fact that the negative impact of unexpected MPC does not hold after 2007 requires further 
deliberation. Figure 2 clearly confirms the drop in average investments around 2008-09 while Figure 
3 displays the sharp movements (in opposite directions) of both capital investments and unexpected 
MPC around 2008-09.  Figure 3 apparently implies a significant inverse relationship between both 
these variables. However, a lack of a significant relationship in the augmented specification for the 
1991-2010 period in Panel A of Table 3 suggests the decrease in investments around 2008-09 is not 
induced by the spike in unexpected MPC and could in fact, be an overall shift in corporate spending 
policy given the economic recession. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) in their survey of Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) across the US, Europe and Asia document 86% of the CFOs of financially 
constrained firms in the US reporting a cut-back in their capital investment projects owing to 
tightening credit conditions. Similarly, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) finds the sub-prime crisis 
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of 2008 led to a decline in investments especially for financially constrained firms or firms with a 
significant dependence on external sources of finance.  Thus, it appears there was a substantial 
cutback in capital investments around 2008 independent of the increase in unexpected MPC. It needs 
to be noted that rigorous funding provisions introduced by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 came 
into effect from 2008. The interplay of the financial crisis and attempts by firm to meet the revised 
funding regulations could also be responsible for the changed dynamics of the relationship between 
capital investments and unexpected MPC. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
My first set of hypotheses (hypotheses H1a1 through H1a3) aims to examine the magnitude and 
direction of impact of both the components of unexpected MPC on capital investments. Table 4 
reports the responses of capital expenditure to unexpected MPC when the latter is broken down into 
favorable UMPC (savings due to actual MPC being less than expected MPC) and unfavorable UMPC 
(expense or additional contributions due to actual MPC being more than expected MPC).  If a 
negative cash shock leads to a decrease in capital expenditure, it makes an interesting question 
whether a positive cash shock arising due to a reduced actual MPC leads to a symmetric increase in 
capital expenditure.  The 1991-98 period saw investments of sponsor firms exhibit a significant 
negative reaction (at 5% significance level) to unfavorable unexpected UMPC but not to favorable 
unexpected UMPC (Table 4, column 3). Additional contributions (expense) implies cash flow from 
the firm to the pension fund which leads to a cut-back on capital investments. However, reduced 
contributions (saving) implies less than expected cash flow from the firm to the pension fund and this 
does not appear to be an incentive for firms to increase the level of investments.  A similar analysis 
for the 1991-2010 period reveals savings remain insignificant but expense also cannot explain 
variations in capital investments. The difference in the coefficients of savings and expense is 
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significant at 10% for the 1991-1998 period but not so for the 1991-2010 period. A significant 
negative relationship is observed between unfavorable cash shocks (expense) and capital investments 
in the early part of the sample period (1991-98) but not for the entire period (1991-2010), while no 
significant relationship is observed between favorable cash shocks (savings) and capital investments 
in either period, indicative of the asymmetric impact of savings and expense on capital investments. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Table 5 reports the differential impact of unexpected MPC (and of savings and expense) on 
investments based on S&P credit ratings and on the amount of external financing required by firms 
depending on how frequently their capital expenditure exceeds their cash flow (hypotheses H1b1 
through H1b3).  The first criterion is a direct measure of financial constraint. For the latter criterion, 
as Rauh (2006) points out, firms that frequently face a shortfall of cash flow to meet their investment 
plans would need to resort to external finance more often and consequently, the capital investments of 
these firms should be more vulnerable to MPC (or unexpected MPC) or such shifts in internal funds. 
In Table 5, the first tercile for ratings (column 1) comprises firms with no ratings and could be 
representative of either financially sound firms with no need to access debt markets or financially 
weak firms that cannot afford the costs of accessing external financing. The non-investment grade 
firms as well as the investment-grade firms exhibit negative but not significant relationships with 
investments. On the other hand, the firms for which capital investments never exceed their cash flow 
or exceed for less than 1/3rd of the years tend to have a positive relationship with capital investments. 
This is akin to overfunded firms exhibiting a positive relationship between MPC and investments in 
Rauh (2006). Firms that do not face cash shortfall very frequently could be suggestive of firms with 
easy access to cash (external financing) - cash sourced through external funds to meet additional 
contributions could incentivize greater capital expenditure as well.  In fact, the impact of financing 
cash flows does monotonically increase from the least cash-crunch to the most cash-crunched.  It is to 
be noted that the capital investments for the most cash-crunched firms respond negatively and in fact, 
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more strongly to expected MPC rather than to unexpected MPC. One could argue on similar lines as 
in Rauh (2006) that these contributions labelled as predictable are not actually predictable for these 
firms, or their planning horizon is not long enough to accommodate expected MPC. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Table 6 repeats the analyses in Table 5 to examine the behavior of capital investments in response to 
the two components of unexpected MPC - saving and expense, in the sub-sample framework. No 
explanatory power is observed for the variables of interest in the rating sub-samples. In case of the 
cash-constraint sub-samples (based on how frequently capital expenditure exceeds the cash flow of 
the firm), expense leads to a significant reduction in capital expenditure of the most cash-constrained 
firms (whose capital expenditure exceeds cash flow for more than one-third of the firm-year 
observations).  Apparently, these are the firms that are most vulnerable to a cash shock and should be 
more dependent on external financing. However, savings fail to exhibit a significant relationship with 
the capital investments for this same set of firms, thereby, confirming an asymmetric relationship in 
the response of capital expenditure to favorable (saving) and unfavorable (expense) unexpected MPC 
of the sponsor firm. Interestingly, expected MPC remains negative and significant at a 10% 
significance level for the most cash-constrained firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
In order to ensure the proxy for unexpected MPC constructed using the methodology in Rauh (2006), 
I report the sample statistics and the major regression analyses using the two proxies constructed 
using actual allocation data from P&I survey and from Compustat for the period 2003-10 (this period 
is common to all the three proxies). The sample is filtered to firms that are common to each of the 
three sources – theoretical construct, P&I survey (referred to as P&I sample hereon) and Compustat 
(referred to as Compustat sample hereon).   The reason for filtering a common sample thus is that the 
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asset classification data in the P&I sample is the most comprehensive relative to that of the theoretical 
sample or the Compustat sample. 
The summary statistics reported in Table 7 are indicative of the typical profile of the firms in this 
common sample or the P&I sample (versus the profile of the entire sample of firms in Table 1) – 
larger (mean firm assets of $40 billion in this sample versus $5 billion in the entire sample) and older 
(mean age of 46 years in this sample versus 20 years in the entire sample). The mean pension assets 
and liabilities in this sample are, as expected, much bigger than that in the entire sample. 
Interestingly, the mean funded status of these firms (0.023) is weaker than that of the entire sample 
(0.032).  This could be because the effects of the financial crisis dominate this sample period of eight 
years in a more pronounced manner versus the original sample period of 20 years. 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
In the regression specifications for this common sample, the coefficient for unexpected MPC using 
the theoretical methodology (-0.090) is almost the same as that of unexpected MPC using P&I survey 
data (-0.091) and is not very different from that of unexpected MPC using Compustat data (-0.255). 
The similarity in coefficient for the P&I sample and the theoretical sample implies the findings 
reported in Tables 2 through 6 using the theoretical construct are valid. Further, since all three proxies 
for unexpected MPC are negative but insignificant in this common sample, it allows us to infer the 
capital expenditures of these larger and older firms are more planned and not sensitive to negative 
cash shocks. Since larger and aged firms are generally representative of financially unconstrained 
firms, these findings are in line with Rauh (2006) who finds MPC is not a  significant shock for the 
financially unconstrained firms.   
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
Table 9 similarly reports the impact of favorable and unfavorable components of unexpected MPC on 
investments for this common sample. The coefficients for unfavorable MPC is negative throughout, 
57 
 
as expected, and insignificant in each category except in the Compustat sample (significant at 10%). 
The lack of a strong significant relationship is not a surprise since this set of firms constitute DB 
sponsors with the largest pension plans and generally classify as large and old firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
If unexpected MPC is a stronger and more refined proxy of an exogenous financial constraint than 
MPC (and expected MPC) based on Rauh (2006) and the findings above, especially for the 1991-
2007 period (Table 3 Panel B), it is pertinent to identify the firms and plans that are more vulnerable 
to these financial shocks. In line with hypotheses H2a and H2b, I now examine if the risk profile of 
pension assets and plan characteristics affect the incidence of unexpected MPC.  In Table 10, the risk 
profile of pension assets is proxied using the percentage of equity allocation in the pension investment 
portfolio while plan characteristics include the amount of pension assets and pension liabilities (as a 
percentage of firm assets), the log of firm employees (the data for active employees is not available) 
and the investment return on plan assets.  
The results in Table 10 do not offer evidence of a positive relationship as hypothesized between the 
probability of unexpected MPC and a greater allocation of pension assets to equity, at least for the 
theoretical sample and the P&I sample.  The fact that the coefficient is instead negative (though not 
significant because of the use of one-tailed hypothesis test) in both these samples despite the 
difference in sample sizes and the sample periods is supportive of a negative relationship between 
equity investment and the probability of unexpected MPC.  However, this negative relationship goes 
against the expected positive relationship between both variables – logically, a greater equity 
allocation implies greater vulnerability to market movements and therefore, a greater probability of 
unexpected MPC. The positive sign before equity allocation in the Compustat sample does conform 
to my hypothesized relationship but further analysis is needed to conform or reject the hypothesized 
relationship.   
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Further, in line with earlier literature, well-funded plans are expected to be more risky (greater equity 
allocation) in their investment policies (Rauh, 2009). This suggests an increase in pension assets 
(liabilities) should increase (lower) the probability of unexpected MPC.  Each of pension assets and 
pension liabilities exhibit signs contrary to the hypothesized relationship but consistent with the 
relationship between equity allocation and probability of unexpected MPC. Though not significant in 
the directional hypothesis framework, an increase in pension assets (liabilities) tends to lower 
(increase) the probability of unexpected MPC. 
The number of employees of the firm is an imperfect proxy for the number of active employees in the 
plan which has been found to have a positive relationship with the level of risk in pension investment 
strategy in prior studies. More active employees implies a greater duration of the pension obligations 
(Rauh, 2009). Despite being an inadequate representation of the number of plan participants, log of 
employees exhibits a positive sign as expected. Lagged investment returns, included in the 
specification as a control variable, seem to reduce the probability of unexpected MPC. The dummy, 
introduced to account for the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the funding provisions under the 
Pension Protection Act, 2006, that came into effect in 2008, exhibits a positive relationship with the 
occurrence of unexpected cash shocks as well. This could be traced to the significant shocks in the 
equity market around the financial crisis. 
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
The negative relationship (albeit not significant under the one-tailed hypothesis test) observed 
between equity allocation and the incidence of unexpected MPC is puzzling. One could argue all 
three methodologies (the theoretical proxy, the P&I proxy and the Compustat proxy) use a long-run 
return on assets in the process of calculating expected pension assets and this levels out fluctuations 
in the MPCs. The alternative is to assume a short-term average to estimate the expected value of 
pension assets but such assumptions are firm-level choices and it is difficult to determine which 
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assumption would be the best. In fact, a more recent average could introduce further biases and 
thereby, induce greater unexpected MPC but this study chooses a long-term average that would 
reduce the scope for any bias. 
The results in Table 11 assess the relationship between the incidence of unexpected MPC and the risk 
profile of pension assets in the light of decomposition of unexpected MPC into saving and expense. 
The dependent variables in the regression analyses in Table 11 are the probability of savings and 
expense (via reduced MPC and additional MPC respectively). The theoretical sample comprises the 
largest sample and contains both financially healthy and unhealthy firms over the period 1991-2010. 
The Compustat sample contains similar firms but over a shorter time-frame i.e., 2003-10 while the 
P&I sample firms are corporate DB plan sponsors with the largest pension assets analyzed over the 
2001-10 period.  It is interesting a greater percentage of equity investment reduces the probability of 
savings in all three samples (the relationship is insignificant owing to the one-tailed test).  Risky 
allocation however, significantly increases the chances of additional contributions in only the 
theoretical sample. The response of probability of expense to equity allocation is positive but not 
significant in the Compustat sample. The positive (negative) relationship between the probability of 
greater expense (saving) and equity allocation is the reason why financially weak firms choose not to 
invest in equity – they might not be able to afford the additional contributions or chances of reduced 
savings resulting from aggressive allocation of pension assets.  
The log of employees, though not the perfect proxy for active share of employees (Rauh, 2009), 
affects the sponsor’s investment policy and therefore, the probability of unexpected MPC positively 
in most of the specifications. Plans with larger asset base (and therefore, relatively better-funded and 
more inclined toward a relatively riskier asset allocation) witness a strong (though not significant) 
reduction in the probability of added contributions in all the samples and the probability of savings in 
case of the Compustat sample.  This could also be indicative of very well-funded plans with no legal 
requirement for MPC and a lesser scope for unexpected MPC (saving and expense) as well. Again, 
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plans with relatively greater pension obligations face increased chances of unexpected MPC (both 
savings and expense) for all the samples. One could reckon, with reference to the coefficients for both 
pension assets and pension liabilities, that well-funded plans are less exposed to unexpected MPC 
(both saving and expense). The lagged actual return on pension investments exhibits the expected 
sign and significantly impacts the incidence of unexpected MPC with an increase (decrease) in the 
probability of savings (expense). 
[INSERT TABLE 11] 
The relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of unexpected MPC, as posited in 
hypotheses H2c, is explored in Table 12. The hypothesized relationship predicted a positive 
association between financially healthy firms and the occurrence of unexpected MPC - this category 
of firms chooses riskier pension investments and therefore, should be more vulnerable to market 
volatility.  However, I find a negative relationship (not significant because of the one-tailed 
hypothesis test) instead which implies firms with sound credit standing face a lesser incidence of 
unexpected MPC. This could be attributable to the fact that well-funded plans bear little or no MPC 
obligation and therefore, minimal scope for unexpected MPC or that their investment choices involve 
risk in the right direction. Equity investment is riskier than debt investment (or cash) but there is the 
question of choosing the right level and type of risk within the equity portfolio too. 
[INSERT TABLE 12] 
A further break-down of unexpected MPC into favorable and unfavorable components in Table 13 
reveals highly rated firms are less prone (not significant in the one-tailed framework) to facing 
unexpected MPC, whether it be in the form of savings or additional expense (contributions). This 
could be, as aforesaid, indicative of very well-funded plan sponsors with no significant obligation to 
pay MPC (and therefore, no significant unexpected MPC). The alternative reason could be superior 
investment management styles of these high-rated firms that help them contain additional 
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contributions. However, this explanation would have held more appeal if these firms exhibited a 
positive relationship with the probability of savings.  
[INSERT TABLE 13] 
The evidence in Table 11 suggests greater equity allocation reduces the chances of savings but 
increases the chances of expense while Table 13 suggests high rating is associated with lesser chances 
of both savings and expense.  Table 14 and Table 15 present all the firm and plan parameters in an 
integrated framework and further incorporate an interaction variable (Ratings * % Equity Allocation) 
to assess the joint impact of rating and equity allocation – do high-rated firms that opt for greater 
equity allocation face greater unexpected MPC?   
In Table 14, the coefficients for rating remain strongly (though not significantly due to the one-sided 
nature of the hypothesis tested) negative especially for the P&I and the theoretical samples. Equity 
Allocation remains strongly negative only in case of the P&I sample suggesting equity investments 
does reduce the probability of unexpected MPC. Interestingly, the interaction variable is positive and 
significant in the P&I sample which suggests increase in equity allocation by high-rated firms 
increases the chances of unexpected MPC. This is in line with the hypothesized relationship – highly-
rated firms should be more vulnerable to unexpected MPC since these firms tend to invest in riskier 
portfolios than financially weaker firms do.  The negative relationship between equity allocation and 
the percentage of unexpected MPC remains puzzling though and therefore, it is pertinent to 
understand how the probability of saving and expense (rather than only unexpected MPC) responds to 
equity allocation under the full model specification. 
[INSERT TABLE 14] 
Table 15 examines the response of the probability of saving and of expense to rating, equity 
allocation and the interaction term of both, in an integrated framework that contains both firm and 
plan parameters. High-rated firms are less exposed to unexpected MPC (both saving and expense) in 
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most of the sample specifications. Equity allocation reduces the incidence of unexpected savings in 
both the theoretical and the P&I samples. However, it exhibits a significantly positive relationship 
with the probability of expense (at a 1% significance level) in the theoretical sample and a negative 
one (again not significant due the one-sided nature of the hypothesis tested) in the P&I sample.  
Again, the significant and positive coefficient of the interaction variable of rating and equity 
allocation, suggests high-rated firms that increase equity allocation has a positive relationship with 
the probability of both savings and expense in the P&I sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 15] 
To summarize, the probability of unexpected MPC is greater for plans with lesser equity allocation, 
less (more) pension assets (liabilities) and weaker firms (with low ratings). This goes against the 
positive relationship I had posited for each of equity allocation, funded status and firm ratings with 
the incidence of unexpected MPC. A further decomposition of unexpected MPC reveals the 
probability of saving (expense) significantly reduces (increases) with greater equity allocation which 
is partially in line with what I had expected (a positive association between percentage equity and 
probability of savings and expense). The probability of saving and expense are generally lower for 
firms with superior ratings, which could be reflective of the over-funded plans of these sponsors that 
are not legally required to pay mandatory contributions. The results in the integrated specification 
(most stringent) with both firm and plan parameters reveal that highly rated firms that increase equity 
allocation face a significant chance of unexpected MPC (increased probability of saving and expense 
in the P&I sample). The results are not very strong or consistent with the theoretical and Compustat 
samples.  Since the P&I sample offers the most accurate asset classification data, there is reason to 
believe that the results for this sample would be deemed more sound compared to the theoretical or 
the Compustat sample.  
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As per the results above, the impact of unexpected MPC (additional contributions) is significant on 
the capital investments of the sponsor firm, especially for cash-crunched firms. I have also observed 
the probability of unexpected MPC is higher for low-rated firms as well. Given this background, it is 
pertinent to understand if the incidence of unexpected MPC translates into higher cash flow volatility 
for the plan sponsor, especially in case of financially constrained firms (Hypothesis 3a). If such an 
association is identified, it would be logical to assume that the debt market could potentially penalize 
the firm for the added risk accruing from unexpected MPC. In fact, Minton and Schrand (1999) 
document that cash flow volatility is positively associated with cost of external financing.  
Interestingly, Table 16 documents a positive significant association with the cash flow volatility of 
the firm for the theoretical sample for the period 1991-2010.  Further examination reveals expense 
(additional contribution) appears to significantly increase (at a 5% significance level) the fluctuations 
in the cash flow of the firm while savings does not.  
[INSERT TABLE 16] 
Table 17 contains results for the P&I sample for the 2000-2010 period and no significant impact of 
unexpected MPC or either of its components on cash flow volatility is observed for this sample. This 
insulation from cash shocks could be attributable to the very nature (larger and older) of the firms in 
these sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 17] 
In the Compustat sample for the 2003-2010 period, unexpected MPC (and expense) can significantly 
explain variations in the cash flow volatility of the firm. Unexpected savings does not seem to have 
any significant explanatory power in any of the model specifications.  
[INSERT TABLE 18] 
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Table 19 contains the full model specification (with both saving and expense) for each sample but 
divided into sub-samples based on investment and non-investment grade S&P firm ratings. Expense 
(unexpected additional contributions) exerts a strong positive impact on cash flow volatility for both 
the non-investment and investment-grade firms for the theoretical sample at 5% significance level. 
Surprisingly, savings tend to reduce the cash flow fluctuations for the investment grade firms in the 
theoretical sample with a 10% significance level.  
For the P&I firms (deemed to be generally financially healthy as apparent from the skew in the 
sample size: only 96 firms belong to the non-investment grade while 286 firms pertain to the 
investment grade), unexpected expense significantly increases the volatility of cash flows while 
unexpected savings serve to significantly attenuate the cash flow volatility for the non-investment 
category.  
In the Compustat sample, the results are similar to the theoretical sample with unexpected expense 
significantly increasing the fluctuations in the cash flow of the DB sponsors in the non-investment 
category. 
[INSERT TABLE 19] 
The above results demonstrate unexpected MPC (expense) serves to increase the cash flow volatility 
of DB pension sponsors, especially for non-investment grade sponsors. It now remains to be seen if 
this volatility is penalized by the debt market in the form of an increased cost of debt. I hypothesize 
the positive relationship between MPC and cost of debt documented in earlier literature is stronger in 
case of unexpected MPC rather than expected MPC (Hypothesis 3b) and that this stronger 
relationship should be more pronounced in case of financially constrained firms (Hypothesis 3c). To 
investigate this hypothesis, I consider 2,509 bonds that have been issued between 1991 and 2010.  
Table 20 contains the descriptive statistics for these 2,309 bonds in Panel A. The average spread for 
these bonds, the difference between the cost of debt and the corresponding treasury spread, is 188 
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basis points. The spread reported in Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) is 193 basis points for 1,877 
bond issues for the 1990-2000, while in Campbell et al. (2012) is 161 basis points for 2,012 bonds for 
the period 1991-2007. The spread in this study is apparently higher than that in Campbell et al. (2012) 
owing to the increase in cost of borrowing during the financial crisis. The stark contrast in the spread 
variations between the investment-grade (0.142) and the non-investment grade (0.385) issues is 
apparent in Panel B and Panel C. The unexpected and expected MPC seem to follow a similar 
distribution in both Panel B and Panel C while the funded status is slightly stronger for the investment 
grade issues. It is to be noted that the non-investment grade issues comprise 23% of the total sample 
consistent with the average rating of Baa1 for the entire sample in Panel A. 
[INSERT TABLE 20] 
Table 21 investigates the relationship between unexpected MPC (and its favorable and unfavorable 
components) and cost of debt. Prior literature documents a positive relationship between MPC and 
cost of borrowing, suggestive of the mechanism underlying the negative relationship between MPC 
and investments – non-investment grade issuers choose to forego positive capital investments rather 
than access the debt market for expensive financing.  In line with that finding, I expect to find a 
stronger relationship of cost of debt with unexpected MPC than with expected MPC since the former 
is a more refined proxy of a financial constraint.  However, I find neither a significant nor a positive 
relationship between MPC and cost of debt in this study.  More importantly, this negative relationship 
between both the variables persists (not significantly due to the one-sided hypothesis test) for both 
unexpected and expected MPC for non-investment grade firms in the theoretical sample. Further 
when unexpected MPC is decomposed into saving (reduced contributions implying a favorable cash 
shock) and expense (additional contributions implying an unfavorable cash shock), expense tends to 
have a strong negative relationship with borrowing costs.  Further, unexpected MPC seems a stronger 
determinant of cost of debt than expected MPC is for the non-investment grade issues; however, the 
sign is opposite to what I had expected. 
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[INSERT TABLE 21] 
Contrary to the hypothesized relationship, unexpected MPC has no significant impact on the cost of 
debt while expected MPC has a significant positive association with cost of debt for the non-
investment grade issues. The latter relationship, though significant, does not appear logical. On the 
other hand, the finding that stands out in Table 22 is the significantly negative coefficient for saving 
for the non-investment grade bond issues in the P&I sample. This implies an increase in favorable 
unexpected MPC tends to reduce the cost of debt of the sponsor firm.  Further, the association of 
unexpected MPC (saving) with cost of debt is stronger than that of expected MPC with cost of debt. 
This conforms to the relationship hypothesized in 3(c).  
 [INSERT TABLE 22] 
The results in Table 23 for the Compustat sample are similar to that of the theoretical sample. 
Additional contribution (expense) appears to have a strong (though not significant) negative impact 
on the cost of debt for the non-investment grade bonds, and the relationship of cost of debt is stronger 
with unexpected MPC than with expected MPC. Though the direction of this relationship contradicts 
logic, the strength of the relationship is in line with my hypothesis that unexpected MPC, being a cash 
shock or a more refined proxy of a financial constraint, should have greater explanatory power than 
expected MPC.  
[INSERT TABLE 23] 
In the above analyses, most of the control variables, barring a few, appear to bear the expected signs. 
In the theoretical sample (Table 21), the log of years to maturity exhibits a negative (even if not 
significant) relationship with the yields for the non-investment grade and a significantly positive 
relationship with the yields for the investment grade issues. This is contrary to logic since a longer 
duration should be penalized with a higher cost of debt especially for below-investment grade bonds. 
Again, in the theoretical sample (Table 21, columns 2 and 3), the plan funded status, representative of 
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the firm’s financial health, appears to have an inverse relationship (as expected) with the dependent 
variable in the entire sample. The dummy introduced to account for the financial crisis of 2008 and 
the funding provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 seems to be positively related with 
borrowing costs for the entire sample in case of the theoretical construct (Table 21, column 1) and for 
the non-investment grade firms in the Compustat sample (Table 23, column 4 and 5). This positive 
relationship could be suggestive of the impact of the financial crisis characterized by increased 
information uncertainty and market volatility.  
In order to confirm if the reverse causal directions suggested in Tables 21, 22 and 23 persist with the 
debt issue ratings by Moody’s (instead of cost of debt), I carry out regression analyses for each 
sample again. LaMonte (2006) argue MPC should not result in increased cost of debt since funds 
simply flow from the firm to the pension fund.  The findings in Campbell et al. (2012) also do not 
support a significant relationship between Moody’s ratings and MPC. I examine if the absence of a 
significant relationship holds in case of unexpected MPC and expected MPC as well or whether the 
relationships are significant but with reversed signs. Tables 24 through 26 document the relationships 
of each of MPC, unexpected MPC (saving and expense) and expected MPC with Moody’s rating for 
each of the three samples.  The numerical equivalent of the rating variable is defined such that higher 
values of the dependent variable imply lower ratings and vice versa (Aaa equals 1 and Ca equals 20).  
In Campbell et al. (2012), the coefficient for MPC is negative and significant in the entire sample.  
In the theoretical sample (Table 24), the coefficient for MPC is negative and insignificant. However, 
non-investment grade issues exhibit a strong negative relationship between unexpected MPC (and 
expense) with rating, suggesting unexpected cash shocks lead to better ratings. Therefore, the impact 
of saving and expense on rating are examined separately to mesh out a more precise (and 
conceptually correct) directional relationship.  The negative relationship between unexpected MPC 
and rating persists between expense and rating as well (again, not significantly owing to the one-
tailed nature of the hypothesis tested) – greater expense leads to enhanced ratings.  A negative 
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relationship is observed for expected MPC as well for the non-investment grade bonds (column 4). 
Interestingly, the sign before funded status is negative as expected – a more funded plan is reflective 
of a financially healthier firm and therefore, calls for better ratings. The strong negative relationship 
between unexpected MPC (and expense) and rating, though contrary to logic, seems to suggest 
ratings do not account for MPC but do account for unexpected MPC, a proxy for cash shocks.  
[INSERT TABLE 24] 
Results for the P&I sample in Table 25 do not exhibit a significant relationship between MPC or 
unexpected MPC (and its components) and credit rating. This could be possibly because these firms 
are financially more robust and are less prone to unexpected MPCs unless of course, they opt for 
greater equity allocations (as observed in Tables 14 and 15).   
[INSERT TABLE 25] 
In the Compustat sample, the negative association between unexpected MPC and ratings holds in the 
entire sample but not for the sub-samples. Surprisingly, MPC also exhibits a negative relationship 
with Moody’s rating while pension funded status which has been significant in the theoretical and the 
P&I samples is not significant in this sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 26] 
Overall, the results that unexpected MPC (or expense) leads to an improvement in ratings, even if not 
significantly owing to the one-sided nature of the hypotheses, are contrary to logic. The obvious 
question that follows is if Moody’s ratings have started to consider the risk of MPC in the post-
crisis/the Pension Protection Act, 2006 period.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines the relationship of pension asset allocation risk with capital investments, cash 
flow volatility and cost of debt of the firm. The effect of pension investment risk is captured through 
unexpected mandatory pension contribution (MPC) using three different proxies – one based on the 
methodology in Rauh (2006), the second based on actual asset allocation data available from Pension 
& Investments (P&I) survey data and the third using pension allocation data reported in 10-K filings 
available from Compustat. All three proxies follow the methodology proposed in Campbell et al. 
(2012) to construct a proxy for MPC using 10-K filings rather than Form 5500 filings. The former 
proves to be more user-friendly and timely relative to the Form 5500 filings available from the 
Department of Labor. I also decompose unexpected MPC into two components – favorable (saving 
owing to actual contribution being less than the expected) and unfavorable (expense owing to actual 
MPC being greater than expected MPC) to derive a more refined definition of a financial constraint in 
all my analyses. 
First, I find unexpected MPC (or its components) bears no significant impact on capital investments 
for the 1991-2010 period in my augmented model specification. However, I do observe a significant 
negative relationship between unexpected MPC and capital investments for the 1991-2007 period at a 
5% significance level that leads us to suspect a structural break in the pattern post-2008. I conjecture 
the decline in capital investments in 2008 and thereafter is more than what MPC (or unexpected 
MPC) could significantly explain. Interestingly though, sub-sample analyses for the 1991-2010 
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period based on a cash-constraint measure (how frequently capital expenditure of firms exceed their 
cash flows) indicate a significant negative relationship between investments and unexpected MPC 
(and expense) in case of the most cash-crunched firms.  No significant relationship is however, 
observed in case of saving, implying an asymmetric pattern in the response of investments to saving 
and expense. To ensure the validity of these results that use the theoretical construct, I repeat the 
major analyses using firms from the P&I sample that are also present in the other two samples 
(theoretical and Compustat) as well. Albeit no significant relationships are observed, the analyses do 
serve to confirm the validity of the theoretical construct – the coefficients for the theoretical proxy is 
very similar to that of the P&I proxy. The reason for the  absence of a significant negative 
relationship could be attributable to the older and larger nature of the firms in this common sample - 
such firms are expected to have more planned investments and thus, be less affected by unexpected 
cash shocks. 
Second, contrary to what I expected, I find the percentage of equity allocation used to represent 
investment risk does not lead to a higher probability of unexpected MPC. However, the 
decomposition of unexpected MPC reveals that the percent of equity allocation bears a significant 
positive relationship with the incidence of additional unexpected contributions (expense) for the 
theoretical proxy and a negative relationship (not significant due to the one-sided nature of the 
hypothesis being tested) with the incidence of reduced contributions (implicit cash savings) for each 
of the three proxies. This could be a reason why weakly funded plans or firms with low ratings tend 
to keep away from equity investments. Similarly, I find firms with high ratings are less exposed to the 
probability of unexpected MPC (and of expense and saving as well) for each of the three proxies. 
However, in a comprehensive framework with both plan and firm parameters, I find high-rated firms 
(in the P&I sample) that tend to increase the percentage of equity allocation face a significantly 
greater probability of unexpected MPC, and of saving and expense as well.  Since this result holds for 
the P&I proxy that builds on the most refined asset classification categories relative to the other two 
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proxies, it would be justified to infer that firms with superior ratings do face a higher risk of 
unexpected MPC when they increase the risk in their pension investment strategies.  
Given unexpected MPC is a financial constraint to firms, and earlier studies that document a positive 
relationship of MPC and cost of debt, I propose a similar positive relationship of cost of debt with 
unexpected MPC. I posit the positive relationship between the two would be stronger than that 
between cost of debt and expected MPC and that this stronger nature of the relationship should persist 
mostly among the financially constrained firms. Before moving to explore this hypothesis, I attempt 
to identify a relationship of this unexpected cash shock with the cash flow volatility of the firm. My 
premise is that an association between this unexpected cash shock and cash flow volatility is what 
would be penalized by the lenders of the firm through a higher cost of borrowing.  In line with my 
expectations, I find a positive relationship of cash flow fluctuations with unexpected MPC (and of 
expense) for the theoretical as well as the Compustat sample. The results in the P&I sample are not 
significant but are in the predicted direction for unexpected MPC as well as for saving and expense. 
Further sub-sample analyses suggest a significant positive relationship between expense and cash 
flow volatility for non-investment grade firms in case of all the three proxies. 
Having documented the positive impact these unexpected pension cash obligations could have on the 
cash flow risk of the firm, I now examine if this translates into a higher cost of debt as well.  I do not 
find support for a positive association between cost of debt and unexpected MPC (and expense) in 
both the theoretical as well as the Compustat samples for non-investment grade issues. The main  
finding that conforms to my expectations is the significant negative relationship observed for 
unexpected saving and cost of debt for the below-investment grade issues in the P&I sample – 
increase in favorable cash shocks (saving) leads to an decrease in the borrowing costs of the firm. 
Additional contribution (expense) exhibits a positive relationship with cost of debt for this P&I 
sample but the relationship is not significant. It is to be noted that this sample comprises 63 
observations and it is possible the results are sensitive to the sample size.  Overall, though most of the 
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main relationships are in conflicting directions, it is observed unexpected MPC (saving or expense) 
has a stronger impact than expected MPC for the non-investment grade issues.  
As a robustness test, I carry out these cost of debt specifications with Moody’s bond ratings 
(numerical equivalent defined such that high rating implies high risk and vice-versa). I again fail to 
find a positive relationship between rating and unexpected MPC (and expense) for non-investment 
grade issues in the theoretical sample and for the entire sample in the Compustat sample. Each of 
these relationships that suggest unfavorable cash shocks leads to better bond ratings contradicts my 
arguments.  The negative relationship (albeit not significant due to the one-sided nature of the 
hypothesis being tested) of rating with MPC in the P&I as well the Compustat sample leads to an 
obvious question of whether there has been a change in the considerations of Moody’s policy for 
bond ratings in the context of pension contributions.  
My research therefore, has identified, by employing a more refined version of a financial constraint 
using the two components of unexpected MPC, an association of pension asset risk with capital 
investments and cash flow volatility of the firm. My attempt to identify a significant relationship of 
unexpected MPC with cost of debt or bond ratings needs to be validated further – one way could be to 
examine if unexpected MPC constructed using Form 5500 filings exhibits a relationship with cost of 
debt (bond ratings) similar to that documented in this study. 
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APPENDICES  
 Appendix I: Data Definitions 
Age Number of years a firm is in Compustat  
Altman’s Z-score (3.3*EBIT/Operating Assets)+(Sales/Operating Assets)+1.4*(Retained 
Earnings/Operating Assets)+1.2*(Net Operating Capital/Operating Assets) 
Capital Expenditure  Capital investments of the firm 
Book-to-market equity Book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
Cash flow to asset ratio Non pension cash flow to firm assets 
Cash flow volatility  Standard deviation of yearly cash flow for the preceding five years where 
cash flow = net income plus depreciation & amortization plus pension 
expense 
Expected MPC If lagged expected funded status is less than zero, expected MPC= service 
cost plus (lagged expected ABO less lagged expected FVPA)/30. For years 
2008 and after, the funding gap is divided by 7 instead of 30. If lagged 
expected funded status is greater than equal to zero, expected MPC=0. 
Financing cash flow Cash paid or received for all transactions classified as financing activities 
(available in Compustat) 
Firm assets  Total firm assets  
Investment grade 
indicator 
A dummy variable equal to one if the credit rating is Baa3 or higher 
Leverage Long-term debt of the firm 
Mandatory Pension 
Contributions (MPC) 
If lagged funded status is less than zero, MPC= service cost plus (lagged 
ABO less lagged FVPA)/30. For years 2008 and after, the funding gap is 
divided by 7 instead of 30. If lagged funded status is greater than equal to 
zero, MPC=0 
[FVPA= fair value of pension assets, ABO= Accumulated Benefit 
Obligations, PBO= Projected Benefit Obligations] 
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Market Value of Equity  Shares outstanding times market price per share 
Moody’s Rating The bond issue's rating from Moody’s at the time of offering (available 
from SDC). Ratings range from Aaa (the most credit worthy) to Ca (the 
least credit worthy) and have been converted to its equivalent such that 
Aaa equals 1 and Ca equals 20 
Non pension cash flow  Net Income plus depreciation & amortization plus pension expense, 
divided by lagged firm assets 
Pension assets  Total pension assets of each plan, aggregated at the firm-level 
Pension liabilities Total pension liabilities(PBO) of each plan, aggregated at the firm-level  
Number of years to debt 
maturity 
Years remaining to maturity of the new bond issue 
% Equity  % of pension assets invested in equity 
Plan Funded Status 
(expected) 
FVPA (expected) less ABO (expected) 
Plan Investment Return  Lagged return on pension assets 
Proceeds from debt issue Total proceeds from the new bond issue 
Public debt indicator A dummy variable equal to one if the new bond issue is a publicly issue 
debt else equal to zero if it is a Rule 144a issue 
Return on assets Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged firm assets  
Senior debt indicator A dummy variable equal to one if the new bond issue is a senior bond 
issue else equal to zero 
S&P credit rating  S&P issuer credit rating converted to its numerical equivalent thus: AAA 
equals 21 while D equals one 
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for twenty four months 
ending the last month of previous year 
Spread or Cost of debt less 
treasury rate 
Yield on the first bond issue in year t less yield on a corresponding 
Treasury instrument of similar maturity (as per the SDC New Issues 
Database, and then divided by 1000) 
Tobin’s Q  Market Value of Equity plus total assets less book value of common 
equity less deferred taxes, all divided by firm assets. 
Total employees  Number of employees employed by the firm and its consolidated 
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subsidiaries 
Unexpected MPC (UMPC) Actual MPC less  Expected MPC 
UMPC(savings) If Expected MPC> Actual MPC, Savings = Expected MPC – Actual 
MPC 
UMPC(expense) If Expected MPC < Actual MPC, Expense = Actual MPC – Expected 
MPC 
Volatility of earnings Standard deviation of yearly net income for the preceding five years  
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Appendix II: Standard Indices used for each asset category to compute Expected Return on Pension 
Assets for the P&I and Compustat Sample Firms 
1. Equity (Domestic) – Ibbotson Large-Cap Company Index Return 
2. Equity (International) – MSCI World Ex-Us Equity Index Return 
3. Bond (Domestic) – Ibbotson Long-Term Corporate Bond Index Return 
4. Bond (International)- Citi Government Bond Index 
5. Treasury Bill – Ibbotson Treasury Bills Rate 
6. Real Estate – FTSE NAREIT US all-REITs Total Return 
7. Mortgage – Barclays US MBS Index Return 
8. Alternatives – Morningstar Diversified Alternatives Index Return 
9. Others – Same as Equity(Domestic)  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the period 1991-2010 
Variables 
Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
Minimum  Maximum 
25th  50th  75th  
Capital Expendituret/ Assets(t-1) 20157 0.057 0.051 0.023 0.044 0.076 0.001 0.288 
Nonpension CashFlowt / Assets(t-1) 20157 0.095 0.083 0.053 0.092 0.140 -0.206 0.346 
Lagged Tobin's Q (t-1)  20157 1.518 0.789 1.037 1.255 1.714 0.698 5.259 
Financing Cashflowt/ Assets(t-1) 20157 -0.005 0.111 -0.057 -0.018 0.023 -0.261 0.543 
Leveraget / Assets(t-1) 20136 0.242 0.199 0.089 0.217 0.342 0.000 1.004 
Funded Status(t-1)/ Assets(t-1) 20157 0.032 0.084 -0.004 0.007 0.042 -0.135 0.446 
Aget (Years)  20064 29.025 16.234 14.000 29.000 43.000 4.000 60.000 
Firm Assetst ($millions) 20157 5820.82 15151.88 301.38 1068.00 3852.60 14.69 111148.00 
Pension Assetst ($millions) 20157 611.90 1701.52 15.34 73.90 330.70 0.17 11769.60 
Projected Pension Liabilitiest ($millions) 20157 686.41 1879.88 18.68 85.65 380.03 0.39 12845.00 
Accumulated Pension Liabilitiest ($millions) 20157 477.69 1504.35 0.00 25.94 199.27 0.00 10558.00 
Mandatory Pension Contributiont (MPC)/ Assets(t-1) 20157 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.020 
Unexpected MPCt (Rauh Methodology) / Assets(t-1) 16208 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.016 0.017 
Unexpected MPCt(P&I data)*/ Assets(t-1) 2099 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.022 0.022 
Unexpected MPCt (10-k filings-Compustat)**/ Assets(t-1) 5899 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.026 0.024 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(Rauh Methodology) 16208 0.677 1.720 0.248 0.589 0.882 -6.856 10.467 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(P&I Data)* 1969 0.595 0.164 0.559 0.630 0.690 0.000 0.848 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(10-k filings-Compustat)** 5972 0.596 0.157 0.540 0.620 0.690 0.000 0.960 
Ratingt 10096 0.629 0.157 0.500 0.636 0.773 0.045 1.000 
  All variable definitions are provided in Appendix I           
 * Pertains to period 2000-10 and ** pertains to period 2003-10 
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Table 2 Validation of the proxy for Unexpected MPC using Moody’s definition and Rauh (2006) 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
  Fixed Effect Specification Pooled Specification 
VARIABLES 
Rauh (2006) - 
Table V Col (3) 
(1990-98)    
Moody’s 
version 
(1991-1998)             
Rauh (2006) - 
Table V Col(6)                  
(1990-98)                                
Moody’s 
version 
(1991-1998)   
Moody’s 
version       
(1991-1998)  
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) -0.665** 
(0.315) 
-0.033 
(0.285) 
-0.863** 
(0.428) 
-0.995*** 
(0.335) 
-0.659** 
(0.319) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) -0.779** 0.072 -0.593 -0.917** -0.565 
 
(0.381) (0.311) (0.518) (0.389) (0.376) 
Nonpension cash flow 0.111*** 0.125*** 0.244** 0.241*** 0.254*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Lagged Tobin's Q 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lagged funded status 
 
0.035   -0.059 -0.007 
  
(0.030)   (0.036) (0.034) 
Lagged funded status2 
  
  -0.249** -0.289** 
   
  (0.101) (0.126) 
Lagged funded status3 
  
  0.592 0.422 
   
  (0.552) (0.543) 
Financing cash flow 
  
  
 
0.121*** 
   
  
 
(0.011) 
Leverage 
  
  
 
0.021*** 
   
  
 
(0.006) 
Constant 
 
-0.018   0.023*** 0.017** 
  
(0.027)   (0.007) (0.008) 
    
Observations 8,030 6,682 8,030 6,682 6,680 
Number of groups 1,522 1,438   
  Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No No 
Rauh (2006)uses Form 5500 filings to compute an estimate of MPC while Campbell et al. (2012) uses Form 10-k filings 
(available from Compustat) to construct Moody’s proxy for MPC (LaMonte, 2006). Columns I and III report the original 
coefficients and standard errors as in Rauh (2006). This study follows Campbell et al. (2012) in construction of the MPC 
variable with a slight modification for the period 1991-2010. The unexpected MPC variable is constructed using Rauh 
(2006) and Campbell et al. (2012). *, ** and *** represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. As 
indicated, the regression models (columns 1 and 2) are estimated with firm and year fixed effects while the models in 
columns 3, 4 and 5 contain year fixed effects only. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A 
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   Table 3 Regression Analysis of Capital expenditure on Unexpected and Expected MPC 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Predict Panel A (1991-2010) 
Capital Expenditure  Basic Model Augmented Model 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical)    (-) -0.170** 
 
-0.364** -0.102 
 
-0.232 
 
 (-1.931) 
 
(-1.739) (-1.157) 
 
(-1.145) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) (-) 
 
-0.052 -0.313 
 
-0.044 -0.211 
 
 
 
(-0.426) (-1.269) 
 
(-0.379) (-0.893) 
Nonpension cash flow (+) 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 
 
 (16.962) (16.836) (16.677) (18.585) (18.453) (18.231) 
Lagged Tobin's Q (+) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (-2.018) (-2.017) (-2.002) (-1.001) (-0.998) (-0.988) 
Lagged funded status (+) -0.016 -0.013 -0.028 0.000 0.001 -0.008 
 
 (-1.261) (-1.059) (-1.580) (0.011) (0.093) (-0.473) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.262*** -0.266*** -0.218*** -0.272*** -0.273*** -0.242*** 
 
 (-5.499) (-5.694) (-4.996) (-4.915) (-5.040) (-4.397) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.530*** 0.529*** 0.488*** 0.517*** 0.515*** 0.489*** 
 
 (4.095) (4.168) (4.227) (3.875) (3.937) (3.952) 
Financing cash flow (+) 
   
0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 
 
   
(12.957) (12.981) (13.001) 
Leverage (+) 
   
0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 
 
   
(6.636) (6.647) (6.657) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 
 (-0.906) (-0.736) (-0.705) (-0.477) (-0.366) (-0.350) 
Constant  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 
 
 (3.712) (3.745) (3.708) (2.212) (2.217) (2.209) 
Observations  16,208 16,208 16,208 16,190 16,190 16,190 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to 
the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-
tailed test otherwise. 
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  Table 3 (continued) 
 
Capital Expenditure 
Predict Panel B (1991-2007) 
 Basic Model Augmented Model 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.649*** -0.469** 
 
 (-2.759) (-2.055) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.512** -0.331 
 
 (-1.727) (-1.175) 
Nonpension cash flow (+) 0.253*** 0.267*** 
 
 (16.033) (17.688) 
Lagged Tobin's Q (+) -0.002 -0.001 
 
 (-1.656) (-0.803) 
Lagged funded status (+) -0.034 -0.010 
 
 (-1.786) (-0.543) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.223*** -0.272*** 
 
 (-4.063) (-3.987) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.539*** 0.576*** 
 
 (4.200) (4.108) 
Financing cash flow                    (+) 
 
0.098*** 
 
 
 
(12.346) 
Leverage                    (+)  0.024*** 
 
 
 
(5.540) 
Constant  0.025*** 0.017** 
 
 (3.549) (2.236) 
 
 
  Observations  13,370 13,360 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in 
Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using 
a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 4 Regression Analysis of Capital Expenditure on Unexpected (Saving & Expense) and Expected MPC 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 /𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capital Expenditure Predict 1991-98 1991-2010 
Unexpected MPC - Saving (Theoretical) (?) 0.513 
 
0.642 0.037 
 
0.095 
 
 (1.126) 
 
(1.362) (0.127) 
 
(0.308) 
Unexpected MPC- Expense(Theoretical) (-) 
 
-0.612** -0.666**   -0.259 -0.265 
 
 
 
(-1.788) (-1.893)   (-1.258) (-1.245) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.374 -0.238 -0.558* -0.062 -0.107 -0.154 
 
 (-1.121) (-0.886) (-1.448) (-0.299) (-0.709) (-0.609) 
Non-pension cash flow (+) 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 
 
 (16.634) (16.640) (16.632) (18.454) (18.213) (18.207) 
Lagged Tobin's Q (+) 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (0.912) (0.915) (0.915) (-0.998) (-0.990) (-0.989) 
Lagged funded status (+) 0.013 0.002 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 -0.008 
 
 (0.450) (0.074) (-0.195) (0.066) (-0.450) (-0.474) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.329*** -0.314*** -0.289** -0.272*** -0.245*** -0.242*** 
 
 (-2.684) (-2.645) (-2.297) (-4.974) (-4.645) (-4.420) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.348 0.404 0.423 0.514*** 0.491*** 0.489*** 
 
 (0.644) (0.760) (0.779) (3.941) (3.973) (3.964) 
Financing cash flow (+) 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 
 (11.347) (11.349) (11.341) (12.979) (13.010) (13.007) 
Leverage (+) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 
 (3.629) (3.582) (3.567) (6.648) (6.661) (6.662) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) 
   
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 
   
(-0.371) (-0.311) (-0.324) 
Constant  0.016** 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 
 
 (2.116) (2.169) (2.156) (2.216) (2.218) (2.215) 
Observations  6,680 6,680 6,680 16,190 16,190 16,190 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat(Savings & Expense)    3.84*   0.67 
 Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I 
and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 5 Sub-sample Regression Analysis of Capital Expenditure on Unexpected and Expected MPC for 1991-2010 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡  +    𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   Rating Capital investment minus Cash flow>0 
Capital Expenditure 
Predict No rating 
Non-investment 
grade(BB+ to D) 
Investment grade 
(BBB- & above) 
Never 
Less than 
1/3rd of years 
Greater than 
1/3rd of years 
Unexpected MPC 
(Theoretical) 
(-) 
-0.133 -0.458 -0.235 0.193 0.488 -0.974** 
 
 (-0.475) (-1.006) (-1.076) (0.942) (1.773) (-1.988) 
Expected MPC 
(Theoretical) 
(-) 
-0.138 -0.654 -0.175 0.325 0.593 -1.370** 
 
 (-0.449) (-1.199) (-0.703) (1.429) (1.918) (-2.294) 
Non-pension cash flow (+) 0.231*** 0.189*** 0.272*** 0.311*** 0.275*** 0.334*** 
 
 (13.544) (6.902) (17.352) (17.079) (15.235) (15.022) 
Lagged Tobin's Q (+) 0.002 0.006* -0.002 -0.004 0.003* 0.011*** 
 
 (1.205) (1.404) (-1.417) (-3.237) (1.526) (3.854) 
Lagged funded status (+) -0.007 -0.056 -0.001 0.039** 0.061*** -0.017 
 
 (-0.281) (-1.625) (-0.040) (2.108) (2.878) (-0.434) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.264*** -0.199*** -0.279*** -0.157** -0.252*** -0.485*** 
 
 (-3.270) (-2.684) (-4.015) (-1.824) (-3.294) (-2.992) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.446** 0.886*** 0.492*** 0.154 0.116 1.073*** 
 
 (2.526) (3.255) (3.386) (0.871) (0.805) (2.868) 
Financing cash flow (+) 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.024*** 0.064*** 0.170*** 
 
 (10.989) (6.618) (11.579) (3.627) (6.953) (12.081) 
Leverage (+) 0.025*** -0.007 0.038*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.008 
 
 (4.348) (-0.796) (7.222) (3.357) (2.492) (1.109) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) 0.017 -0.014*** 0.013 -0.021*** 0.004 0.001 
 
 (5.120) (-3.189) (1.676) (-9.276) (0.519) (0.291) 
Constant  -0.006* 0.037*** -0.001 0.019*** 0.003 0.025*** 
 
 (-1.851) (6.656) (-0.177) (7.432) (0.372) (5.927) 
Observations  7,652 2,724 13,466 4,476 6,086 4,628 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in 
Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test 
for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 6  Sub-Sample Regression Analysis of Capital Expenditure on Unexpected (Saving & Expense) and Expected MPC  
Model:𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   Rating (1991-2010) (Capital investment minus Cash)>0 (1991-2010)                       
Capital Expenditure 
Predict No rating 
Non-investment 
grade(BB+ to D) 
Investment grade 
(BBB- & above) 
Never 
Less than 
1/3rd of years 
Greater than 1/3rd 
of years 
Unexpected MPC - Saving 
(Theoretical) 
(?) -0.078 
 
 
 
0.435 
 
 
0.073 0.242 -0.226 0.237 
(Theoretical)  (-0.185) (0.547) (0.229) (0.642) (-0.618) (0.263) 
Unexpected MPC – Expense 
(Theoretical)  
(-) -0.189 
(-0.628) 
-0.464 
(-1.053) 
-0.272 
(-1.170) 
0.271 
(1.286) 
0.430 
(1.641) 
-1.176** 
(-2.304) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.055 -0.646 -0.105 0.119 0.427 -1.111* 
 
 (-0.169) (-1.033) (-0.406) (0.427) (1.489) (-1.612) 
Non-pension cash flow (+) 0.231*** 0.189*** 0.272*** 0.310*** 0.266*** 0.334*** 
 
 (13.536) (6.886) (17.339) (17.032) (15.486) (15.027) 
Lagged Tobin's Q (+) 0.002 0.006* -0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.011*** 
 
 (1.204) (1.404) (-1.420) (-3.209) (0.737) (3.833) 
Lagged Funded status (+) -0.007 -0.056 -0.001 0.040** 0.045*** -0.019 
 
 (-0.284) (-1.636) (-0.037) (2.137) (2.406) (-0.471) 
Lagged Funded status2 (-) -0.264*** -0.198*** -0.279*** -0.163** -0.238*** -0.481*** 
 
 (-3.294) (-2.724) (-4.040) (-1.911) (-3.965) (-3.035) 
Lagged Funded status3 (?) 0.446** 0.886*** 0.492*** 0.168 0.166 1.071*** 
 
 (2.536) (3.259) (3.400) (0.951) (1.335) (2.908) 
Financing cash flow (+) 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.024*** 0.061*** 0.170*** 
 
 (10.990) (6.629) (11.580) (3.650) (6.637) (12.091) 
Leverage (+) 0.025*** -0.007 0.038*** 0.016*** 0.011** 0.008 
 
 (4.348) (-0.799) (7.225) (3.347) (2.275) (1.107) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) 0.017 -0.014*** 0.013 -0.021*** 0.003 0.002 
 
 (5.141) (-3.119) (1.705) (-9.520) (0.424) (0.548) 
Constant  -0.006* 0.037*** -0.001 0.019*** 0.005 0.025*** 
 
 (-1.820) (6.654) (-0.174) (7.439) (0.746) (6.038) 
Observations  7,652 2,724 13,466 4,476 7,086 4,628 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat (Savings-Expense)  0.04 0.68 0.57 0.00 1.64 1.52 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, 
** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a 
two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for the Pension & Investments (P&I) Sample (2003-2010) 
Variables 
Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
Minimum Maximum 
25th  50th  75th  
Capital Expendituret/ Assets(t-1) 1209 0.047 0.033 0.025 0.040 0.063 0.001 0.181 
Nonpension CashFlowt / Assets(t-1) 1209 0.104 0.068 0.061 0.101 0.144 -0.113 0.279 
Lagged Tobin's Q (t-1)  1209 1.657 0.758 1.116 1.399 1.937 0.820 6.074 
Financing Cashflowt/ Assets(t-1) 1209 -0.035 0.072 -0.075 -0.035 -0.001 -0.228 0.246 
Leveraget / Assets(t-1) 1208 0.231 0.133 0.135 0.219 0.308 0.000 0.648 
Funded Status(t-1)/ Assets(t-1) 1209 0.023 0.113 -0.023 0.000 0.025 -0.163 0.716 
Aget (Years)  1208 46.341 15.289 42.000 54.000 57.000 7.000 61.000 
Firm Assetst ($millions) 1209 40927.87 109479.30 5158.43 13029.10 32609.00 1330.70 795337.00 
Pension Assetst ($millions) 1209 4064.59 7803.20 737.90 1493.90 3479.00 179.22 49252.00 
Projected Pension Liabilitiest ($millions) 1209 4633.62 8363.29 896.00 1800.00 4097.00 194.88 51428.00 
Accumulated Pension Liabilitiest ($millions) 1209 4013.09 7621.69 673.50 1458.00 3598.40 0.00 47416.00 
Mandatory Pension Contributiont (MPC)/ Assets(t-1) 1209 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.023 
Unexpected MPCt (Rauh Methodology) 936 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.024 0.022 
Unexpected MPCt(P&I data) 1000 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.024 0.020 
Unexpected MPCt (10-k filings-Compustat) 757 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.030 0.023 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(Rauh Methodology) 936 0.850 0.785 0.552 0.724 0.999 -1.142 3.636 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(10-k filings-Compustat) 765 0.632 0.110 0.580 0.650 0.700 0.270 0.870 
Equity Allocation(t-1)(P&I Data) 946 0.602 0.155 0.560 0.630 0.690 0.000 0.850 
Ratingt 1155 0.682 0.140 0.591 0.682 0.773 0.136 1.000 
All variable definitions are provided in Appendix I 
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Table 8 Regression Analysis of Capital Expenditure on Unexpected and Expected MPC for the 
P&I Sample firms 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   Pooled Specification(2003-10) 
Capital Expenditure Predict Theoretical  P&I Sample Compustat Sample 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.090 
  
 
 (-0.189) 
  Expected MPC (Theoretical) (-) -0.254 
  
 
 (-0.454) 
  Unexpected MPC (P&I Allocation) (-) 
 
-0.091 
 
 
 
 
(-0.197) 
 Expected MPC (P&I Allocation) (-) 
 
-0.177 
 
 
 
 
(-0.312) 
 Unexpected MPC (Compustat Allocation) (-) 
  
-0.255 
 
 
  
(-0.600) 
Expected MPC (Compustat Allocation) (-) 
  
-0.281 
 
 
  
(-0.603) 
Nonpension cash flow (+) 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.319*** 
 
 (9.227) (9.475) (9.103) 
Lagged Tobin’s Q (+) -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 
 
 (-3.645) (-3.618) (-3.812) 
Lagged funded status (+) 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 
 (0.051) (0.091) (0.131) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.275*** -0.252*** -0.193* 
 
 (-2.390) (-2.410) (-1.561) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.352*** 0.315*** 0.215 
 
 (2.654) (2.668) (1.362) 
Financing cash flow (+) 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 
 
 (3.507) (3.493) (3.256) 
Leverage (+) 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.030** 
 
 (2.920) (3.135) (2.236) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) -0.003 -0.015* -0.009 
 
 (-0.413) (-1.573) (-0.700) 
Constant  0.030*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 
 (4.954) (4.334) (2.862) 
Observations  935 1,010 756 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables 
are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 9 Regression Analysis of Capital Expenditure on Unexpected (Saving & Expense) and 
Expected MPC for the P&I Sample firms (2003-2010) 
Model:𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡  +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   Pooled Specification(2003-10) 
Capital Expenditure  Theoretical  P&I Sample Compustat Sample 
Unexpected MPC- Saving (Theoretical) (?) -1.113 
  
 
 (-1.088) 
  Unexpected MPC- Expense (Theoretical) (-) -0.285 
  
 
 (-0.685) 
  Expected MPC(Theoretical) (-) 0.249 
  
 
 (0.337) 
  Unexpected MPC- Saving (P&I Allocation) (?) 
 
-1.150 
 
 
 
 
(-1.157) 
 Unexpected MPC- Expense (P&I Allocation) (-) 
 
-0.319 
 
 
 
 
(-0.796) 
 Expected MPC(P&I Allocation) (-) 
 
0.311 
 
 
 
 
(0.432) 
 Unexpected MPC- Saving( Compustat Allocation) (?) 
  
-1.351 
 
 
  
(-1.299) 
Unexpected MPC- Expense (Compustat Allocation) (-) 
  
-0.510* 
 
 
  
(-1.409) 
Expected MPC(Compustat Allocation) (-) 
  
0.401 
 
 
  
(0.595) 
Nonpension cash flow (+) 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.322*** 
 
 (9.220) (9.469) (9.191) 
Lagged Tobin’s Q (+) -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 
 
 (-3.664) (-3.692) (-3.859) 
Lagged funded status (+) 0.003 0.003 0.010 
 
 (0.114) (0.122) (0.307) 
Lagged funded status2 (-) -0.283*** -0.249*** -0.194* 
 
 (-2.502) (-2.443) (-1.611) 
Lagged funded status3 (?) 0.361*** 0.309*** 0.207 
 
 (2.724) (2.637) (1.325) 
Financing cash flow (+) 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 
 
 (3.530) (3.437) (3.271) 
Leverage (+) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.028** 
 
 (2.860) (3.023) (2.123) 
Crisis (-) 0.002 0.001 -0.007 
 
 (0.267) (0.167) (-0.486) 
Constant  0.030*** 0.029*** 0.041*** 
 
 (4.969) (5.115) (2.675) 
Observations  935 999 756 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables 
are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 10 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC on Pension Plan 
Characteristics 
Model: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Probability of Unexpected MPC 
 
Theoretical  
P&I 
Sample 
Compustat 
Sample 
Predict 1991-2010 2000-2010 2003-2010 
Lagged %Equity(Theoretical) (+) -0.065 
  
 
 (-10.463) 
  Lagged %Equity(P&I Allocation) (+) 
 
-0.409 
 
 
 
 
(-1.368) 
 Lagged % Equity(Compustat Allocation) (+) 
  
0.125 
 
 
  
(0.653) 
Lagged employees(log) (+) 0.209*** 0.041 0.147*** 
 
 (10.062) (0.604) (4.984) 
Lagged pension assets(log) (+) -0.217 -0.189 -0.100 
 
 (-11.968) (-2.549) (-3.760) 
Lagged pension liabilities(as % of firm assets) (-) 1.277 1.109 0.932 
 
 (7.773) (3.735) (4.183) 
Lagged investment return on pension assets (?) -0.468** -0.917 -0.817*** 
 
 (-2.475) (-1.275) (-3.120) 
Dummy for 2008 (+) 1.056* 3.061*** 0.717** 
 
 (1.499) (10.848) (1.734) 
Constant  0.696 -0.298 0.575 
 
 (0.988) (-0.656) (1.378) 
 
 
   Observations  16,017 1,815 5,673 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed 
test otherwise. 
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Table 11 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) on Plan Characteristics 
Model:  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
 Probability of Saving  Probability of Expense 
  
 
Theoretical  
P&I 
Sample 
Compustat 
Sample 
 
Theoretical  
P&I 
Sample 
Compustat 
Sample 
Probability of Unexpected MPC Predict 1991-2010 2000-2010 2003-2010 Predict 1991-2010 2000-2010 2003-2010 
Lagged %Equity (Theoretical) (+) -0.510 
  
(+) 0.085*** 
  
 
 (-18.955) 
  
 (12.199) 
  Lagged %Equity (P&I Allocation) (+) 
 
-0.619 
 
(+)   -0.251 
 
 
 
 
(-1.871) 
 
   (-0.876) 
 Lagged % Equity (Compustat Allocation) (+) 
  
-0.339 (+)   
 
0.197 
 
 
  
(-2.128)    
 
(1.173) 
Lagged employees (log) (+) 0.119*** -0.058 0.005 (+) 0.178*** 0.063 0.158*** 
 
 (6.919) (-0.902) (0.252)  (10.160) (0.958) (6.249) 
Lagged pension assets (log) (+) -0.155 -0.078 -0.033 (+) -0.171 -0.178 -0.098 
 
 (-10.358) (-0.914) (-1.616)  (-11.088) (-2.696) (-4.313) 
Lagged pension liabilities (as % of firm 
assets) 
(-) 
0.620 0.373 0.010 
(-) 
1.134 1.013 0.980 
 
 (4.906) (1.379) (0.071)  (8.130) (3.536) (5.298) 
Lagged investment return on pension assets (+) 4.130*** 3.215** 4.038*** (-) -2.052*** -2.086*** -3.213*** 
 
 (13.799) (2.252) (11.121)  (-10.981) (-2.763) (-11.617) 
Dummy for 2008 (-) 2.231 2.458 0.895 (+) -0.520 -0.843 -0.699 
 
 (2.177) (9.077) (12.787)  (-1.022) (-4.162) (-1.692) 
Constant  -1.627 -1.071** -0.746***  0.252 0.934** 0.247 
 
 (-1.590) (-2.017) (-6.095)  (0.497) (2.415) (0.595) 
 
 
   
   
  Observations  15,397 1,008 5,661  15,582 1,695 5,673 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in 
Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for 
variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise.  
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Table 12 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC on Firm Characteristics 
Model:  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑆&𝑃 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑍‒ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 +
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
   Theoretical P&I Sample                Compustat Sample                    
Probability of Unexpected MPC Predict (1991-2010) (2000-2010) (2003-2010) 
Rating  (+) -1.888 -2.270 -1.478 
 
 (-7.521) (-4.242) (-4.097) 
Lagged assets (log) (+) 0.296*** 0.278** 0.076 
 
 (5.511) (2.334) (1.191) 
Lagged pension assets (log) (+) -0.271 -0.265 -0.090 
 
 (-5.583) (-1.965) (-1.523) 
Lagged Altman Z-score (+) 0.026 -0.012 -0.001 
 
 (0.727) (-0.162) (-0.026) 
Lagged cash flow volatility (?) -0.471 1.045 -0.912 
 
 (-0.655) (0.776) (-1.039) 
Lagged pension liabilities(as % of firm assets) (-) 1.628 1.123 0.589 
 
 (4.741) (2.067) (1.671) 
Lagged cash flow to asset ratio (+) 0.088 1.302 0.186 
 
 (0.189) (1.252) (0.313) 
Dummy for 2008 (+) 1.787*** 3.012*** 0.562 
 
 (2.769) (9.585) (1.120) 
Constant  -0.589 -1.372** 1.394** 
 
 (-0.814) (-2.057) (2.316) 
Observations  7,624 1,690 3,011 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are 
defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using 
a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 13 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) on Firm Characteristics 
Model:  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 / 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 )𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆&𝑃 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑍‒ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
   Probability of UMPC(Saving) Probability of UMPC(Expense) 
Probability of UMPC 
(Saving/Expense) 
Predict 
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I Sample              
(2000-2010) 
 Compustat  
 (2003-2010) 
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I Sample               
(2000-2010) 
Compustat  
(2003-2010) 
Rating  (+) -1.402 -1.648 -0.892 -1.363 -1.719 -0.927 
 
 (-6.558) (-2.592) (-3.093) (-6.045) (-3.290) (-3.058) 
Lagged assets(log) (+) 0.222*** 0.031 0.071* 0.183*** 0.283*** 0.030 
 
 (6.240) (0.297) (1.513) (4.175) (2.538) (0.562) 
Lagged pension assets(log) (+) -0.171 0.003 -0.051 -0.186 -0.289 -0.055 
 
 (-5.600) (0.022) (-1.160) (-4.859) (-2.471) (-1.134) 
Lagged Altman Z-score (+) -0.002 0.032 -0.041 0.052 -0.026 0.031 
 
 (-0.094) (0.436) (-1.151) (1.619) (-0.352) (0.775) 
Lagged cash flow volatility (?) 0.459 2.946* 1.203 -0.784 -0.048 -1.469** 
 
 (0.752) (1.659) (1.536) (-1.246) (-0.042) (-1.974) 
Lagged pension liabilities(% of firm assets) (-) 0.739 -0.346 -0.293 1.241 1.294 0.618 
 
 (3.431) (-0.775) (-1.059) (4.513) (2.521) (2.012) 
Lagged cash flow to asset ratio (+) 1.008** 1.306 1.549*** -0.504 0.782 -0.603 
 
 (2.355) (1.046) (2.644) (-1.139) (0.756) (-1.133) 
Dummy for 2008 (-,+) 1.234 2.685 1.208 -0.545 -0.991 -1.494 
 
 (12.192) (9.038) (11.707) (-0.767) (-4.559) (-2.938) 
Constant  -0.942*** -1.318* -0.511** -0.232 -0.010 1.195** 
 
 (-4.289) (-1.952) (-1.991) (-0.307) (-0.016) (2.057) 
Observations  7,294 887 3,004 7,332 1,575 3,011 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and 
***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted 
and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 14 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC on Firm and Plan Characteristics 
 Model: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + %𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
        𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Probability of Unexpected MPC 
Predict Theoretical                  
(1991-2010) 
P&I Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat Sample 
(2003-2010) 
Rating  (+) -1.763 -8.425 -1.214 
 
 (-6.855) (-3.944) (-0.88) 
Lagged %Equity (Theoretical) (+) -0.015 
  
 
 (-0.332) 
  Rating*Lagged % Equity (Theoretical) (+) -0.085 
  
 
 (-1.259) 
  Lagged %Equity (P&I) (+) 
 
-6.957 
 
 
 
 
(-3.071) 
 Rating*Lagged % Equity (P&I) (+) 
 
9.428*** 
 
 
 
 
(2.866) 
 Lagged % Equity (Compustat) (+) 
  
0.388 
 
 
  
(0.320) 
Rating*Lagged %Equity (Compustat) (+) 
  
-0.404 
 
 
  
(-0.193) 
Lagged assets (log) (+) 0.230*** 0.188* 0.028 
 
 (3.576) (1.295) (0.362) 
Lagged pension assets (log) (+) -0.274 -0.230 -0.081 
 
 (-5.579) (-1.319) (-1.338) 
Lagged Altman Z-score (+) -0.025 -0.051 -0.030 
 
 (-0.584) (-0.578) (-0.539) 
Lagged cash flow volatility (?) -0.632 -0.062 -1.024 
 
 (-0.871) (-0.038) (-1.141) 
Lagged pension liabilities (as % of firm assets) (-) 1.524 0.860 0.505 
 
 (4.393) (1.402) (1.368) 
Lagged cash flow to asset ratio (+) 0.232 1.296 0.364 
 
 (0.498) (1.103) (0.591) 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Probability of Unexpected MPC 
Predict Theoretical                  
(1991-2010) 
P&I Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat Sample 
(2003-2010) 
Lagged employees(log) (+) 0.082** 0.105 0.050 
 
 (2.070) (1.235) (0.941) 
Lagged investment return on pension assets (?) -0.751** -0.883 -1.521*** 
 
 (-2.369) (-1.127) (-3.266) 
Dummy for 2008 (+) 2.136*** 3.140*** 1.082** 
 
 (3.086) (9.378) (1.955) 
Constant  -0.359 3.652** 1.179 
 
 (-0.461) (2.340) (1.539) 
Observations  7,584 1,569 2,921 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I 
and ***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 15 Regression Analysis of Probability of Unexpected MPC (Saving / Expense) on Firm and Plan Characteristics 
Model: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + %𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2008 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
  
 Probability of Saving Probability of Expense 
Probability of Saving/Expense 
Predict 
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I 
Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat 
Sample                   
(2003-2010) 
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I 
Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat 
Sample                   
(2003-2010) 
Rating  (+) -1.522 -3.785 0.302 -1.296 -4.224 -1.231 
 
 (-6.537) (-2.572) (0.287) (-5.502) (-2.393) (-1.087) 
Lagged %Equity (Theoretical) (+) -0.632 
  
0.162*** 
  
 
 (-7.303) 
  
(2.972) 
  Rating*Lagged % Equity 
(Theoretical) 
(+) 
0.053 
  
-0.092 
  
 
 (0.502) 
  
(-1.176) 
  Lagged %Equity (P&I) (+) 
 
-2.677 
  
-2.834 
 
 
 
 
(-1.806) 
  
(-1.540) 
 Rating*Lagged % Equity (P&I) (+) 
 
3.490* 
  
3.745* 
 
 
 
 
(1.522) 
  
(1.361) 
 Lagged % Equity (Compustat) (+) 
  
0.815 
  
-0.095 
 
 
  
(0.839) 
  
(-0.097) 
Rating*Lagged %Equity (Compustat) (+) 
  
-1.958 
  
0.491 
 
 
  
(-1.181) 
  
(0.280) 
Lagged assets (log) (+) 0.213*** -0.037 0.089* 0.130*** 0.167 -0.029 
 
 (4.672) (-0.292) (1.587) (2.448) (1.268) (-0.448) 
Lagged pension assets (log) (+) -0.197 0.081 -0.048 -0.174 -0.225 -0.046 
 
 (-5.784) (0.518) (-1.007) (-4.516) (-1.598) (-0.911) 
Lagged Altman Z-score (+) -0.029 0.055 -0.007 0.013 -0.084 -0.014 
 
 (-0.810) (0.631) (-0.162) (0.325) (-0.916) (-0.301) 
Lagged cash flow volatility (?) 0.191 2.986 1.005 -0.828 -1.010 -1.531* 
 
 (0.295) (1.448) (1.271) (-1.304) (-0.776) (-1.886) 
Lagged pension liabilities (% of firm 
assets) 
(-) 
0.757 -0.514 -0.191 1.145 0.906 0.509 
 
 (3.208) (-0.994) (-0.661) (4.101) (1.657) (1.565) 
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Table 15(continued) 
Probability of Saving/Expense Predict 
Probability of Saving Probability of Expense 
 
  
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I 
Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat 
Sample                   
(2003-2010) 
Theoretical 
(1991-2010) 
P&I 
Sample 
(2000-2010) 
Compustat 
Sample                   
(2003-2010) 
  
Lagged cash flow to asset ratio (+) 1.080*** 1.306 1.509*** -0.308 0.985 -0.396 
  (2.431) (1.040) (2.610) (-0.689) (0.842) (-0.716) 
Lagged employees (log) (+) 0.036 -0.037 -0.052* 0.065* 0.107* 0.076** 
 
 (1.075) (-0.451) (-1.390) (1.905) (1.329) (1.746) 
Lagged investment return on pension 
assets 
(?) 
4.408*** 3.538** 3.564*** -2.434*** -2.070** -3.552*** 
 
 (9.224) (2.296) (6.333) (-7.786) (-2.434) (-7.883) 
Dummy for 2008 (-,+) 1.042 2.647 1.039 -0.693 -0.942 -0.516 
 
 (10.195) (8.250) (9.705) (-1.094) (-4.254) (-0.924) 
Constant  -0.788*** 0.001 -1.520** 0.451 2.585** 1.157 
 
 (-2.676) (0.001) (-2.402) (0.646) (2.016) (1.331) 
 
 
      Observations  7,259 864 2,915 7,295 1,463 2,921 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I 
and ***, ** and * next to the z-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 16 Regression Analysis of Cash Flow Volatility on Unexpected MPC (Saving/Expense) for 
the Theoretical Sample 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Cash flow volatility 
Predict (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Theoretical Sample (1991-2010) 
Unexpected MPC  (+) 0.072* 
   
 
  (1.523) 
   Unexpected MPC (Expense)  (+) 
 
0.092** 
 
0.091** 
 
  
 
(2.211) 
 
(2.093) 
Unexpected MPC (Saving)  (?) 
  
0.029 0.011 
 
  
  
(0.280) (0.105) 
Expected MPC  (+) 0.076* 0.046 0.002 0.041 
 
  (1.338) (1.251) (0.035) (0.552) 
Plan funded status  (-) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
  (1.194) (1.243) (0.742) (1.241) 
Rating  (-) -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 
  (-1.874) (-1.893) (-1.931) (-1.889) 
Log of firm assets  (-) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
  (1.016) (1.050) (0.942) (1.051) 
Leverage  (+) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
  (2.888) (2.880) (2.961) (2.878) 
Return on assets  (-) 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
 
  (9.368) (9.366) (9.369) (9.363) 
Income volatility  (+) 0.959*** 0.959*** 0.959*** 0.959*** 
 
  (124.210) (124.194) (123.635) (123.896) 
Book-to-market  (?) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 
  (-2.069) (-2.074) (-2.061) (-2.072) 
Dummy for 2008  (+) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 
  (-1.175) (-1.229) (-1.115) (-1.236) 
Constant   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
  (0.143) (0.121) (0.240) (0.122) 
Observations   8,509 8,509 8,509 8,509 
Number of Firms   1,126 1,126 1,126 1,126 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test 
otherwise. 
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Table 17 Regression Analysis of Cash Flow Volatility on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) 
for the P&I Sample 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Cash flow volatility Predict P&I  Sample(2000-2010) 
Unexpected MPC (+) 0.069 
   
 
 (0.837) 
   Unexpected MPC (Expense) (+) 
 
0.040 
 
0.053 
 
 
 
(0.613) 
 
(0.716) 
Unexpected MPC (Saving) (?) 
  
-0.174 -0.192 
 
 
  
(-0.946) (-0.959) 
Expected MPC (+) 0.035 -0.006 0.058 0.084 
 
 (0.336) (-0.100) (0.492) (0.581) 
Plan funded status (-) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.437) (0.278) (0.208) (0.438) 
Rating (-) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (-0.169) (-0.213) (-0.233) (-0.169) 
Log of firm assets (-) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (-0.876) (-0.887) (-0.907) (-0.886) 
Leverage (+) 0.006** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 
 
 (2.195) (2.200) (2.173) (2.180) 
Return on Assets (-) 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
 
 (4.307) (4.322) (4.262) (4.272) 
Income volatility (+) 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.964*** 0.963*** 
 
 (63.478) (63.247) (63.280) (63.383) 
Book-to-market (?) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
 (-1.869) (-1.855) (-1.888) (-1.893) 
Dummy for 2008 (+) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
 (-1.802) (-1.763) (-1.787) (-1.752) 
Constant  0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 
 (1.087) (1.119) (1.159) (1.082) 
Observations  1,860 1,860 1,860 1,860 
Number of Firms  335 335 335 335 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 18 Regression Analysis of Cash Flow Volatility on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) 
for the Compustat Sample 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Cash flow volatility Predict Compustat Sample(2003-2010) 
Unexpected MPC (+) 0.097*** 
   
 
 (2.455) 
   Unexpected MPC (Expense) (+) 
 
0.114*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
 
 
(2.925) 
 
(2.748) 
Unexpected MPC (Saving) (?) 
  
0.092 0.029 
 
 
  
(0.983) (0.298) 
Expected MPC (+) 0.092** 0.044* -0.045 0.026 
 
 (1.847) (1.404) (-0.768) (0.385) 
Plan funded status (-) 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 
 (1.057) (1.102) (0.714) (1.086) 
Rating (-) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (-0.030) (-0.025) (-0.058) (-0.026) 
Log of firm assets (-) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
 (-0.244) (-0.219) (-0.303) (-0.218) 
Leverage (+) 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 
 
 (1.809) (1.787) (1.891) (1.794) 
Return on assets (-) 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 
 (6.220) (6.174) (6.218) (6.163) 
Income volatility (+) 0.970*** 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.970*** 
 
 (104.751) (104.580) (103.914) (104.864) 
Book-to-market (?) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (-0.315) (-0.269) (-0.267) (-0.256) 
Dummy for 2008 (+) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (-1.598) (-1.542) (-1.329) (-1.489) 
Constant  0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 
 
 (0.342) (0.306) (0.411) (0.304) 
Observations  3,464 3,464 3,464 3,464 
Number of Firms  740 740 740 740 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 19 Sub-Sample Regression Analysis of Cash Flow Volatility on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) based on S&P Ratings 
Model: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
      
  
 Theoretical Sample                       
(1991-2010) 
P&I Sample                                  
(2000-2010) 
Compustat Sample                        
(2003-2010) 
Cash flow volatility 
Predict Non-
investment 
Grade 
Investment 
Grade 
Non-
investment 
Grade 
Investment 
Grade 
Non-
investment 
Grade 
Investment 
Grade 
Unexpected MPC (Expense) (Theoretical) (+) 0.173** 0.078** 
    
 
 (1.994) (1.977) 
    Unexpected MPC (Saving)(Theoretical) (?) 0.239 -0.197* 
    
 
 (1.217) (-1.770) 
    Unexpected MPC (Expense) (P&I) (+) 
  
0.322* -0.010 
  
 
 
  
(1.395) (-0.214) 
  Unexpected MPC (Saving)(P&I) (?) 
  
-0.717** -0.161 
  
 
 
  
(-2.243) (-1.235) 
  Unexpected MPC (Expense) (Compustat) (+) 
    
0.249*** 0.033 
 
 
    
(2.712) (0.843) 
Unexpected MPC (Saving)(Compustat) (?) 
    
0.129 -0.066 
 
 
    
(0.842) (-0.586) 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) (+) 0.050 0.126* 
    
 
 (0.438) (1.506) 
    Expected MPC (P&I) (+) 
  
0.469*** 0.060 
  
 
 
  
(2.376) (0.663) 
  Expected MPC(Compustat) (+) 
    
0.075 0.029 
 
 
    
(0.649) (0.373) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,707 5,802 332 1,527 1,284 2,180 
Number of Firms  561 746 95 283 343 474 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I and 
***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as 
predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 20 Descriptive Statistics for Bonds issued between 1991 and 2010 
   
 Panel A: Entire sample 
Variables Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 25% Median  75% 
Spread 2509 0.188 0.158 0.080 0.130 0.238 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) 2156 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexpected MPC (P&I) 751 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexpected MPC (Compustat) 820 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) 2156 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (P&I) 751 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (Compustat) 820 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Funded status 2509 0.032 0.091 -0.004 0.004 0.037 
Return on assets 2509 0.043 0.050 0.012 0.035 0.071 
Leverage 2509 0.287 0.192 0.147 0.266 0.372 
Market value of equity 2509 16895.480 30645.690 1847.843 5616.875 16654.600 
Book to market equity 2509 0.509 0.359 0.284 0.473 0.670 
Stock return volatility 2509 0.089 0.048 0.057 0.077 0.105 
Proceeds from debt maturity 2509 491.798 664.174 149.292 250.000 499.525 
Years to debt maturity 2509 12.143 9.241 7.083 10.144 10.208 
Senior debt indicator 2509 0.906 0.291 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Investment grade indicator 2509 0.811 0.392 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Credit rating 2509 8.038 3.378 6.000 8.000 10.000 
Public debt indicator 2509 0.861 0.347 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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 Table 20 (continued) 
 Panel B: Investment-grade bonds issued  
Variables Obs. Mean Std Deviation 25% Median  75% 
Spread 2035 0.142 0.113 0.072 0.108 0.167 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) 1765 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexpected MPC (P&I) 686 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexpected MPC (Compustat) 679 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) 1765 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (P&I) 686 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (Compustat) 679 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Funded status 2035 0.034 0.090 -0.003 0.004 0.038 
  
 Panel C: Non-investment grade bonds issued 
Variables Obs. Mean Std Deviation 25% Median  75% 
Spread 474 0.385 0.170 0.261 0.367 0.495 
Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) 391 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexpected MPC (P&I) 65 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Unexpected MPC (Compustat) 141 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Expected MPC (Theoretical) 391 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (P&I) 65 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Expected MPC (Compustat) 141 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Funded status 474 0.025 0.095 -0.014 0.004 0.034 
 All variables defined in Appendix I 
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Table 21 Regression Analysis of Cost of Debt on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) for the Theoretical Sample (1991-2010) 
Model: 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution (MPC) (+) -0.349 
      
  
(-0.520) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
-0.788 
 
-5.557 
 
0.091 
 
   
(-1.008) 
 
(-2.227) 
 
(0.113) 
 Unexpected MPC - Saving (-) 
  
1.000 
 
2.423 
 
0.504 
    
(0.482) 
 
(0.420) 
 
(0.236) 
Unexpected MPC - Expense (+) 
  
-0.760 
 
-6.079 
 
0.169 
    
(-0.923) 
 
(-2.298) 
 
(0.201) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
-1.243 -1.349 -4.405 -2.919 -0.248 -0.551 
   
(-1.448) (-1.048) (-1.716) (-0.819) (-0.284) (-0.413) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) -0.013 -0.051* -0.051* -0.121 -0.116 -0.030 -0.029 
  
(-0.451) (-1.591) (-1.586) (-1.020) (-0.974) (-0.928) (-0.915) 
Return on Assets (-) -0.282*** -0.260*** -0.260*** -0.546*** -0.549*** -0.090* -0.090* 
  
(-5.742) (-4.778) (-4.777) (-3.533) (-3.546) (-1.538) (-1.546) 
Leverage (+) 0.033** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.015 0.015 
  
(2.314) (3.037) (3.038) (3.167) (3.089) (0.828) (0.834) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  
(-2.343) (-2.021) (-2.022) (-4.998) (-4.949) (-6.053) (-6.056) 
Book to market equity (?) 0.016** 0.014* 0.014* -0.019 -0.020 0.047*** 0.047*** 
  
(2.460) (1.907) (1.908) (-1.057) (-1.085) (5.146) (5.146) 
Stock return volatility (+) 0.659*** 0.684*** 0.685*** 0.215 0.221* 0.639*** 0.640*** 
  
(11.962) (11.371) (11.355) (1.272) (1.302) (9.540) (9.537) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.019* 0.019* 0.003 0.003 
  
(0.780) (1.103) (1.101) (1.832) (1.871) (1.069) (1.071) 
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Table 21 (continued) 
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.064 -0.064 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  
(3.633) (2.884) (2.876) (-2.306) (-2.293) (4.703) (4.680) 
Moody's Credit Rating(Issue) (+) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
    
  
(19.918) (18.074) (18.063) 
    Senior Debt Indicator (-) -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.020 
  
  
(-0.249) (0.227) (0.228) (1.023) (1.029) 
  Public Debt Indicator (-) -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.010 -0.010 -0.022*** -0.022*** 
  
(-5.547) (-4.583) (-4.582) (-0.510) (-0.502) (-2.422) (-2.423) 
Dummy2008 (+) 0.030** -0.035 -0.035 0.154 0.158 0.040 0.040 
  
(1.877) (-0.516) (-0.519) (1.149) (1.176) (0.512) (0.505) 
Constant 
 
-0.029 0.025 0.025 0.679*** 0.674*** 0.136* 0.136* 
  
(-0.958) (0.335) (0.335) (4.366) (4.318) (1.672) (1.672) 
         Observations 
 
2,509 2,151 2,151 390 390 1,761 1,761 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 22 Regression Analysis of Cost of Debt on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) for the P&I Sample (2000-2010) 
Model: 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution (MPC) (+) -0.404 
      
  
(-0.433) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
-1.347 
 
14.594 
 
-0.684 
 
   
(-0.990) 
 
(1.172) 
 
(-0.497) 
 Unexpected MPC - Saving (-) 
  
2.547 
 
-53.143** 
 
3.079 
    
(0.674) 
 
(-1.848) 
 
(0.797) 
Unexpected MPC - Expense (+) 
  
-1.253 
 
14.594 
 
-0.486 
    
(-0.903) 
 
(1.172) 
 
(-0.345) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
-0.639 -1.217 27.532** 27.532** -0.254 -1.444 
   
(-0.433) (-0.541) (1.800) (1.800) (-0.168) (-0.616) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) 0.019 0.078 0.077 0.514 0.514 -0.004 -0.005 
  
(0.413) (1.297) (1.285) (1.286) (1.286) (-0.060) (-0.076) 
Return on Assets (-) -0.350*** -0.430*** -0.433*** 1.683 1.683 -0.367*** -0.372*** 
  
(-4.474) (-3.348) (-3.358) (1.098) (1.098) (-2.665) (-2.695) 
Leverage (+) 0.044** -0.001 -0.001 0.349* 0.349* 0.015 0.016 
  
(1.844) (-0.027) (-0.017) (1.529) (1.529) (0.313) (0.331) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -0.006 -0.000 -0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.013** -0.012** 
  
(-1.556) (-0.021) (-0.008) (-0.129) (-0.129) (-1.974) (-1.945) 
Book to market equity (?) 0.024** 0.035** 0.035** -0.033 -0.033 0.077*** 0.077*** 
  
(2.446) (2.344) (2.346) (-0.433) (-0.433) (4.395) (4.404) 
Stock return volatility (+) 0.565*** 0.593*** 0.596*** 0.313 0.313 0.635*** 0.643*** 
  
(7.355) (4.630) (4.639) (0.458) (0.458) (4.600) (4.637) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.028 -0.028 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.509) (0.504) (0.505) (-0.394) (-0.394) (0.137) (0.140) 
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Table 22 (continued) 
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) 0.007* 0.010* 0.010* 0.015 0.015 0.016*** 0.016*** 
  
(1.487) (1.529) (1.494) (0.149) (0.149) (2.606) (2.533) 
Moody's Credit Rating(Issue) (+) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
    
  
(14.777) (9.291) (9.286) 
    Senior Debt Indicator (-) 0.002 -0.034 -0.034 
    
  
(0.194) (-1.395) (-1.393) 
    Public Debt Indicator (-) -0.024*** -0.032** -0.032** 0.029 0.029 -0.037** -0.037** 
  
(-2.637) (-2.218) (-2.217) (0.488) (0.488) (-2.239) (-2.243) 
Dummy2008 (+) -0.033 -0.049 -0.051 -0.559 0.062 -0.038 -0.040 
  
(-1.922) (-1.727) (-1.757) (-1.333) (0.415) (-1.279) (-1.355) 
Constant 
 
0.007 -0.013 -0.015 0.380 0.370 0.196*** 0.193*** 
  
(0.155) (-0.169) (-0.184) (0.634) (0.618) (2.869) (2.827) 
         Observations 
 
1,482 705 705 63 63 642 642 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 23 Regression Analysis of Cost of Debt on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) for the Compustat Sample (2003-2010) 
Model: 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution (MPC) (+) -0.882 
      
  
(-0.858) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
-0.417 
 
-8.909 
 
-0.750 
 
   
(-0.343) 
 
(-1.856) 
 
(-0.545) 
 Unexpected MPC - Saving (-) 
  
2.771 
 
4.423 
 
3.286 
    
(0.899) 
 
(0.458) 
 
(0.937) 
Unexpected MPC - Expense (+) 
  
-0.188 
 
-8.875 
 
-0.435 
    
(-0.151) 
 
(-1.833) 
 
(-0.304) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
0.362 -1.019 -7.692 -5.175 -0.361 -1.857 
   
(0.282) (-0.485) (-1.740) (-0.800) (-0.246) (-0.773) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) -0.047 0.153 0.144 -0.280 -0.249 0.069 0.058 
  
(-0.573) (1.177) (1.103) (-0.590) (-0.517) (0.440) (0.370) 
Return on Assets (-) -0.285*** -0.182* -0.182* -0.105 -0.106 -0.037 -0.038 
  
(-3.084) (-1.616) (-1.607) (-0.363) (-0.363) (-0.253) (-0.256) 
Leverage (+) 0.058** 0.017 0.019 0.062 0.052 0.002 0.003 
  
(1.937) (0.423) (0.469) (0.593) (0.483) (0.045) (0.052) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.061** -0.061** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
  
(-0.818) (-0.626) (-0.626) (-2.118) (-2.069) (-2.886) (-2.875) 
Book to market equity (?) 0.031** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.119* 0.120* 0.082*** 0.082*** 
  
(2.311) (2.790) (2.819) (1.908) (1.897) (4.444) (4.463) 
Stock return volatility (+) 0.610*** 0.466*** 0.472*** 0.335 0.390 0.506*** 0.516*** 
  
(6.669) (4.218) (4.262) (0.741) (0.835) (4.087) (4.144) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.040 0.040 0.002 0.002 
  
(0.294) (0.658) (0.636) (1.437) (1.425) (0.283) (0.259) 
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Table 23 (continued) 
Cost of Debt Predict All firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.098 -0.099 0.008 0.007 
  
(1.129) (0.837) (0.739) (-1.642) (-1.636) (1.165) (1.076) 
Moody's Credit Rating(Issue) (+) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
    
  
(10.920) (8.395) (8.382) 
    Senior Debt Indicator (-) 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.013 0.014 
  
  
(0.246) (-0.397) (-0.397) (0.204) (0.208) 
  Public Debt Indicator (-) -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.006 0.007 -0.056*** -0.056*** 
  
(-1.044) (-0.716) (-0.726) (0.152) (0.173) (-2.362) (-2.352) 
Dummy2008 (+) -0.002 -0.037 -0.026 0.114** 0.118** -0.031 -0.019 
  
(-0.148) (-0.344) (-0.244) (1.748) (1.780) (-0.283) (-0.171) 
Constant 
 
-0.053 -0.019 -0.029 0.677*** 0.668*** 0.275** 0.261** 
  
(-0.958) (-0.148) (-0.230) (3.105) (3.030) (2.285) (2.156) 
         Observations 
 
1,143 820 820 141 141 679 679 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 24 Regression Analysis of Credit Rating on Unexpected  MPC(Saving & Expense) for the Theoretical Sample (1991-2010) 
Model:𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑦′𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Moody's Rating (Issue) Predict All Firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution (MPC) (+) -6.310 
      
  
(-0.466) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
-11.294 
 
-74.599 
 
15.516 
 
   
(-0.724) 
 
(-2.602) 
 
(1.005) 
 Unexpected MPC - Saving (-) 
  
44.742 
 
83.954 
 
-0.052 
    
(1.083) 
 
(1.264) 
 
(-0.001) 
Unexpected MPC - Expense (+) 
  
-6.831 
 
-73.042 
 
17.556 
    
(-0.416) 
 
(-2.401) 
 
(1.080) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
0.527 -16.169 -39.872 -44.309 14.196 6.329 
   
(0.031) (-0.630) (-1.352) (-1.081) (0.843) (0.246) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) -2.168*** -2.592*** -2.573*** -1.945* -1.960* -1.226** -1.216** 
  
(-3.847) (-4.086) (-4.055) (-1.423) (-1.427) (-1.985) (-1.966) 
Return on Assets (-) -3.879*** -3.517*** -3.530*** -1.306 -1.297 -2.819*** -2.833*** 
  
(-3.922) (-3.246) (-3.257) (-0.735) (-0.728) (-2.502) (-2.513) 
Leverage (+) 2.496*** 2.667*** 2.678*** 0.801** 0.808** 1.438*** 1.441*** 
  
(8.736) (8.482) (8.509) (1.719) (1.722) (4.012) (4.019) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -0.977*** -0.991*** -0.991*** -0.417*** -0.418*** -0.889*** -0.890*** 
  
(-22.290) (-20.655) (-20.659) (-3.528) (-3.524) (-19.171) (-19.170) 
Book to market equity (?) -0.281** -0.410*** -0.408*** -0.168 -0.166 -0.133 -0.132 
  
(-2.106) (-2.723) (-2.705) (-0.803) (-0.792) (-0.751) (-0.749) 
Stock return volatility (+) 12.648*** 12.675*** 12.730*** 3.556** 3.539** 8.732*** 8.766*** 
  
(11.711) (10.891) (10.921) (1.831) (1.815) (6.759) (6.770) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.061 0.039 0.039 0.026 0.024 0.062 0.062 
  
(1.273) (0.772) (0.760) (0.218) (0.204) (1.316) (1.318) 
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Table 24 (continued) 
Moody’s Rating (Issue) Predict  All Firms  Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) -0.309 -0.325 -0.327 -1.121 -1.122 -0.014 -0.016 
  
(-5.212) (-5.118) (-5.151) (-3.518) (-3.513) (-0.262) (-0.282) 
Senior Debt Indicator (-) -1.800*** -1.768*** -1.764*** -1.085*** -1.085*** 
  
  
(-12.329) (-10.920) (-10.896) (-4.868) (-4.859) 
  Public Debt Indicator (-) -1.167*** -1.182*** -1.181*** -0.624*** -0.624*** -0.312** -0.312** 
  
(-8.924) (-8.292) (-8.289) (-2.696) (-2.692) (-1.807) (-1.809) 
Dummy2008 (?) 2.994*** 1.264 1.230 0.793 0.781 1.951 1.939 
  
(9.373) (0.935) (0.910) (0.516) (0.507) (1.280) (1.272) 
Constant 
 
16.092*** 17.959*** 17.959*** 18.927*** 18.943*** 12.964*** 12.965*** 
  
(32.425) (12.732) (12.732) (10.587) (10.555) (8.254) (8.252) 
         Observations 
 
2,504 2,151 2,151 390 390 1,761 1,761 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 25 Regression Analysis of Credit Rating on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) for the P&I Sample (2000-2010) 
Model:𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑦′𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Moody's Rating (Issue) Predict All Firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution (MPC) (+) -24.479 
      
  
(-1.540) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
3.474 
 
-91.705 
 
15.196 
 
   
(0.154) 
 
(-0.782) 
 
(0.753) 
 Unexpected MPC – Saving (-) 
  
-11.047 
 
-0.314 
 
6.842 
    
(-0.177) 
 
(-0.001) 
 
(0.121) 
Unexpected MPC – Expense (+) 
  
2.885 
 
-91.705 
 
17.021 
    
(0.125) 
 
(-0.782) 
 
(0.823) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
6.837 10.480 -40.520 -40.520 17.011 6.053 
   
(0.279) (0.281) (-0.281) (-0.281) (0.768) (0.176) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) -3.537*** -2.946*** -2.942*** -5.445* -5.445* -2.350*** -2.358*** 
  
(-4.584) (-2.999) (-2.990) (-1.445) (-1.445) (-2.587) (-2.594) 
Return on Assets (-) -3.006*** -2.461 -2.447 5.958 5.958 -1.500 -1.545 
  
(-2.256) (-1.158) (-1.149) (0.413) (0.413) (-0.743) (-0.764) 
Leverage (+) 3.133*** 3.893*** 3.890*** -3.183 -3.183 3.911*** 3.919*** 
  
(7.897) (5.382) (5.370) (-1.481) (-1.481) (5.687) (5.692) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -0.945*** -0.888*** -0.888*** -0.174 -0.174 -0.804*** -0.802*** 
  
(-15.702) (-8.801) (-8.792) (-0.367) (-0.367) (-8.636) (-8.605) 
Book to market equity (?) -0.256 -0.327 -0.327 0.256 0.256 0.052 0.054 
  
(-1.511) (-1.318) (-1.318) (0.359) (0.359) (0.204) (0.211) 
Stock return volatility (+) 10.958*** 11.698*** 11.676*** 4.970 4.970 8.009*** 8.079*** 
  
(8.584) (5.675) (5.640) (0.774) (0.774) (3.958) (3.976) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.006 -0.123 -0.123 1.798*** 1.798*** -0.104 -0.103 
  
(0.092) (-1.280) (-1.280) (2.713) (2.713) (-1.223) (-1.220) 
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Table 25 (continued) 
Moody's Rating (Issue) Predict  All Firms  Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) -0.339 -0.114 -0.113 -0.043 -0.043 0.059 0.056 
  
(-4.163) (-1.050) (-1.035) (-0.045) (-0.045) (0.651) (0.610) 
Senior Debt Indicator (-) -1.383*** -0.559* -0.560* 
    
  
(-6.725) (-1.396) (-1.395) 
    Public Debt Indicator (-) -1.116*** -1.147*** -1.147*** -1.441*** -1.441*** -0.373* -0.374* 
  
(-7.321) (-4.896) (-4.891) (-2.616) (-2.616) (-1.545) (-1.547) 
Dummy2008 (?) 1.713*** 1.067** 1.076** -1.260 0.222 1.235*** 1.210*** 
  
(5.973) (2.264) (2.255) (-0.319) (0.158) (2.867) (2.784) 
Constant 
 
16.955*** 15.880*** 15.887*** 4.176 4.153 12.958*** 12.936*** 
  
(27.242) (13.949) (13.926) (0.741) (0.738) (12.971) (12.918) 
         Observations 
 
1,482 705 705 63 63 642 642 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 26 Regression Analysis of Credit Rating on Unexpected MPC (Saving & Expense) for the Compustat Sample (2003-2010) 
Model:𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑦′𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝐶 (𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
Moody's Rating (Issue) Predict All Firms Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Mandatory Pension Contribution 
(MPC) 
(+) 
-29.225 
      
  
(-1.839) 
      Unexpected MPC (+) 
 
-35.573 
 
-72.655 
 
-10.370 
 
   
(-1.997) 
 
(-1.224) 
 
(-0.589) 
 Unexpected MPC - Saving (-) 
  
48.464 
 
66.964 
 
9.363 
    
(1.070) 
 
(0.560) 
 
(0.208) 
Unexpected MPC - Expense (+) 
  
-34.316 
 
-72.611 
 
-10.494 
    
(-1.877) 
 
(-1.209) 
 
(-0.571) 
Expected MPC (+) 
 
-23.096 -30.659 -70.388 -67.195 -5.678 -5.084 
   
(-1.227) (-0.994) (-1.288) (-0.838) (-0.303) (-0.165) 
Pension Plan Funded Status (-) -0.869 1.906 1.857 3.165 3.204 1.310 1.314 
  
(-0.690) (0.999) (0.969) (0.539) (0.535) (0.655) (0.654) 
Return on Assets (-) -3.246** -1.501 -1.496 -1.182 -1.183 -0.880 -0.880 
  
(-2.271) (-0.905) (-0.901) (-0.330) (-0.326) (-0.466) (-0.465) 
Leverage (+) 2.988*** 4.477*** 4.487*** 1.633 1.620 3.104*** 3.104*** 
  
(6.591) (7.924) (7.924) (1.258) (1.213) (4.665) (4.660) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) (-) -1.014*** -0.953*** -0.953*** -0.224 -0.223 -0.847*** -0.847*** 
  
(-15.538) (-11.993) (-11.982) (-0.625) (-0.614) (-11.272) (-11.261) 
Book to market equity (?) 0.001 0.197 0.200 -0.322 -0.322 0.513** 0.513** 
  
(0.003) (0.850) (0.860) (-0.417) (-0.411) (2.175) (2.171) 
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Table 26 (continued) 
Moody's Rating (Issue) Predict  All Firms  Non-investment grade Investment grade 
Stock return volatility (+) 12.363*** 11.409*** 11.440*** 7.569* 7.638* 7.631*** 7.627*** 
  
(9.105) (7.312) (7.312) (1.354) (1.317) (4.810) (4.779) 
Log(Proceeds from debt issue) (?) 0.105 0.045 0.044 0.194 0.194 -0.074 -0.074 
  
(1.433) (0.487) (0.478) (0.567) (0.560) (-0.855) (-0.853) 
Log(# of years to debt maturity) (+) -0.405 -0.380 -0.383 -2.181 -2.181 -0.131 -0.131 
  
(-4.633) (-3.735) (-3.744) (-2.946) (-2.911) (-1.497) (-1.484) 
Senior Debt Indicator (-) -1.362*** -1.053*** -1.053*** -1.838** -1.838** 
  
  
(-6.017) (-3.953) (-3.949) (-2.293) (-2.265) 
  Public Debt Indicator (-) -1.264*** -1.488*** -1.489*** -0.738* -0.737* -0.353 -0.353 
  
(-7.225) (-6.315) (-6.313) (-1.597) (-1.574) (-1.154) (-1.153) 
Dummy2008 (?) 0.648*** 0.010 0.068 0.381 0.385 0.464 0.459 
  
(3.145) (0.006) (0.043) (0.471) (0.469) (0.336) (0.329) 
Constant 
 
18.055*** 17.813*** 17.752*** 19.857*** 19.846*** 14.402*** 14.408*** 
  
(29.064) (10.294) (10.187) (7.368) (7.256) (9.365) (9.271) 
         Observations 
 
1,143 820 820 141 141 679 679 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix I and ***, ** and * next to the t-statistic indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using a one-tailed test for variables with signs as predicted and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1 Unexpected MPC using the Theoretical construct, P&I survey and Compustat data 
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Figure 2 Trend in Capital Investments 
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Figure 3 Comparison of Capital Investments versus Unexpected MPC (Theoretical) 
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